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INTERMEDIATE JUSTIFICATION LOGICS: UNIFIED COMPLETENESS RESULTS
NICHOLAS PISCHKE
Abstract. We introduce abstract intermediate justification logics by extending arbitrary intermediate propo-
sitional logics with a subset of specific axioms of (classical) justification logic. We study these intermediate
justification logics semantically out of various perspectives by combining the well-known semantical access
points to intermediate logics through algebraic and Kripke-frame based models with the usual semantic machin-
ery used by Mkrtychevs, Fittings or Lehmanns and Studers models for classical justification logics. We prove
unified completeness theorems for all intermediate justification logics and their corresponding semantics using a
respective propositional completeness theorem of the underlying intermediate logic. We consider especially the
particular instances of intuitionistic, classical and Go¨del justification logics because of their previous presence
in the literature.
1. Introduction
Justification logics originated in the 90’s from the studies of Artemov (see [1, 2]) regarding the provability
interpretation of the modal logic S4 (as initiated by Go¨del [19]) and the connected problem of formalizing the
Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation of intuitionistic propositional logic. From there, the prototype jus-
tification logic (the logic of proofs) was substantially generalized and the resulting family of justification logics
gained importance in the context of general (explicit) epistemic reasoning (see the survey [3]) with two recent
textbooks on the subject [4, 25]. The original semantics for the logic of proofs was its intended arithmetical
interpretation in Peano arithmetic but since then, various semantics have been proposed which apply not only
to the logic of proofs but to the whole family of justification logics. Notable instances important in this paper
are the syntactic models of Mkrtychev [30] as well as the possible-world models of Fitting [12, 14] and the recent
subset semantics of Lehmann and Studer [26]. These other semantical access points have been instrumental not
only in demonstrating the strength of justification logics in modeling general epistemic scenarios and classifying
the ontology of justification terms and formulae in classical justification logics but also in inner-logical investi-
gations for properties like decidability (see e.g. [22, 30, 23]).
Besides the classical justification logics, there is a growing literature on non-classical justification logics in-
cluding various streams originating from the formalization of explicit but vague knowledge. There, in particular
importance for this paper is the work on many-valued justification logics (see [16, 17, 34, 35]) and on intuition-
istic justification logics (see [24, 27, 28]). In fact, the Go¨del justification logics from [16, 34, 35] also relate to the
latter, with Go¨del logic, as the base logic, being one of the prime examples of an intermediate logic, originating
from Dummets work [10] (in turn influenced by Go¨dels remarks on intuitionistic logic [18]).
We give a unified semantical theory of the above examples of intuitionistic, Go¨del as well as classical justifi-
cation logics and beyond by introducing abstract intermediate justification logics (that is intermediate propo-
sitional logics over the justification language extended with a collection of designated justification axioms) and
classifying them semantically. Starting at the two characteristic semantical access points for the underlying
intermediate logics of algebraic semantics based on Heyting algebras and of the semantics of Kripke (that is
intuitionistic Kripke frames) based on partial orders, we extended these algebraic and order theoretic approaches
to intermediate logics by the usual (appropriately adapted) semantic machinery for treating justification modal-
ities from the classical models of Mkrtychev [30], Fitting [12, 14] as well as Lehmann and Studer [26]. Here,
the algebraic approach extends the three classes of classical Mkrtychev, Fitting and subset models by allow-
ing the models to take values not only in {0, 1} (or [0, 1] as in the case of Go¨del justification logics) but in
arbitrary Heyting algebras. The approach via intuitionistic Kripke frames extends the previous considerations
for semantics of intuitionistic justification logics by new model classes as well as a wider range of applicable logics.
All these considerations culminate in general unified completeness theorems based on a semantical character-
ization of the underlying intermediate logic. As the class of intermediate justification logics contains especially
the well-known cases of intuitionistic, Go¨del and classical justification logics, these completeness results moreover
contain all the completeness theorems based on Mkrtychev, Fitting and subset models for classical justification
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logics as well as the previous completeness theorems for the Go¨del justification logics with respect to [0, 1]-valued
Mkrtychev and Fitting models and the frame-based completeness theorems for intuitionistic justification logics
as special cases.
2. Intermediate justification logics
2.1. Syntax and proof calculi. We consider the propositional language
L0 : φ ::= ⊥ | p | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ ∨ φ) | (φ→ φ)
where p ∈ V ar := {pi | i ∈ N}. We introduce negation as the abbreviation ¬φ := φ→ ⊥. We also define
n∧
i=1
φn := φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn
for some φ1, . . . , φn ∈ L0. The same applies to ∨. In order to define intermediate logics and later intermediate
justification logics, we need to briefly review some notions regarding propositional substitutions.
A substitution in L0 is a function σ : V ar → L0. This function σ naturally extends to L0 by commuting
with the connectives ∧,∨,→ and ⊥ and we write σ(φ) also for the image of this extended function.
Using this definition of substitutions, we can now give the following definition of an intermediate justification
logic.
Definition 2.1. A intermediate logic (over L0) is a set I ( L0 which satisfies:
(1) the schemes (A1) - (A9) are contained in Γ;
(2) I is closed under modus ponens, that is φ→ ψ, φ ∈ I implies ψ ∈ I;
(3) I is closed under substitution in L0.
Here, the schemes (A1) - (A9) are given by:
(A1): φ→ (ψ → φ);
(A2): (φ→ (χ→ ψ))→ ((φ→ χ)→ (φ→ ψ));
(A3): (φ ∧ ψ)→ φ;
(A4): (φ ∧ ψ)→ ψ;
(A5): φ→ (ψ → (φ ∧ ψ));
(A6): φ→ (φ ∨ ψ);
(A7): ψ → (φ ∨ ψ);
(A8): (φ→ ψ)→ ((χ→ ψ)→ ((φ ∨ χ)→ ψ));
(A9): ⊥ → φ.
We denote the smallest intermediate propositional logic, that is the logic given by the axiom schemes (A1) -
(A9) in L0 and closed under modus ponens, by IPC. Given a set of formulae Γ ⊆ L0, we write
Γ ⊢I φ iff ∃γ1, . . . , γn ∈ Γ
(
n∧
i=1
γi → φ ∈ I
)
.
On the side of justification logics, we consider the following set of justification terms
Jt : t ::= x | c | [t+ t] | [t · t] | !t
where x ∈ V := {xi | i ∈ N} and c ∈ C := {ci | i ∈ N} and the resulting multi-modal language
LJ : φ ::= ⊥ | p | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ ∨ φ) | (φ→ φ) | t : φ
where p ∈ V ar and t ∈ Jt. Naturally, the same abbreviations as for L0 also apply here. Given a set Γ,∆ ⊆ LJ ,
we write Γ⊕∆ for the smallest set containing Γ ∪∆ which is closed under modus ponens.
In order to formulate intermediate justification logics, we consider especially substitutions in LJ . These are
again functions σ : V ar → LJ which extend uniquely to LJ to commuting with ∧,∨,→,⊥ and the justification
modalities t :. We again write σ(φ) for the image of a formula φ ∈ LJ under this extension. By Γ, we denote
the closure of Γ under substitutions in LJ .
Definition 2.2. Let I be an intermediate propositional logic. Given the axiom schemes
(J): t : (φ→ ψ)→ (s : φ→ [t · s] : ψ),
(+): t : φ→ [t+ s] : φ, t : φ→ [s+ t] : φ,
(F ): t : φ→ φ,
(I): t : φ→!t : t : φ,
we consider the following justification logics based on I:
(1) IJ 0 := I ⊕ (J)⊕ (+);
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(2) IJ T 0 := IJ 0 ⊕ (F );
(3) IJ 40 := IJ 0 ⊕ (I);
(4) IJ T 40 := IJ 0 ⊕ (F )⊕ (I).
As before in the propositional case, given Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , we write
Γ ⊢IJL0 φ iff ∃γ1, . . . , γn ∈ Γ
(
n∧
i=1
γi → φ ∈ IJL0
)
.
Specific instances of intermediate propositional logics and of the resulting intermediate justification logics which
we consider explicitly in this paper are
G := IPC ⊕ (LIN), CPC := IPC ⊕ (LEM),
with the schemes
(LIN): (φ→ ψ) ∨ (ψ → φ),
(LEM): φ ∨ ¬φ,
over L0.
Definition 2.3. Let I be an intermediate propositional logic and IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40}. A
constant specification for IJL0 is a set CS of formulae from LJ of the form
cin : · · · : ci1 : φ
where n ≥ 1, cik ∈ CS for all k and φ is an axiom instance of IJL0, that is φ ∈ I or φ is an instance of the
justification axiom schemes (J), (+), (F ), (I) (depending on IJL0).
Constant specifications can be used to augment proof systems and increase the amount of justified formulae
which they can prove.
Definition 2.4. Let I be an intermediate propositional logic and IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40} and
let CS be a constant specification for IJL0. We write Γ ⊢IJLCS φ for Γ ∪ CS ⊢IJL0 φ with Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ .
Note, that the above definition of a constant specification is different from the usual one in the literature.
Normally, one works with a specific set of axiom schemes for the propositional base of the justification logic in
question and allows φ in
cin : · · · : ci1 : φ
only to be an instance of these axioms where here, we allow φ to be an arbitrary theorem of I. This is out of
pure convenience as not introducing the notion of axiomatic systems for intermediate logics makes the following
definitions and results regarding constant specifications more clean to state. Note however, that all results can
be appropriately adapted to constant specifications over axiomatic bases.
If one follows this line of defining axiomatic bases of intermediate logics however, one can similarly define
axiomatically appropriate constant specifications as in the classical case and obtain analogues for the lifting
lemma and internalization. We omit this here as well (see [3, 4, 25] for these concepts in the classical case).
As a straightforward application of classical techniques (see e.g. [25]), one can show directly that all the
intermediate justification logics are conservative over their corresponding intermediate logic and L0.
Lemma 2.5. Let I be an intermediate logic and let IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40}. Let CS be a constant
specification for IJL0. For any φ ∈ L0: ⊢IJLCS φ iff ⊢I φ.
The proof is a natural generalization from the classical case, see e.g. [25] for a version for CPCJ T 4. Further,
we want to mention the deduction theorem for IJLCS .
Lemma 2.6. Let I be an intermediate logic and let IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40}. Further, let CS be
a constant specification for IJL0. For any Γ ∪ {φ, ψ} ⊆ LJ :
Γ ∪ {φ} ⊢IJLCS ψ iff Γ ⊢IJLCS φ→ ψ.
2.2. Extended propositional languages. In later sections, it will be convenient to consider intermediate
logics over different sets of variables. For this, we consider the language
L0(X) : φ ::= ⊥ | x | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ ∨ φ) | (φ→ φ)
where X is a countably infinite set of variables. The same notational abbreviations as before also apply here.
Note also, that naturally L0(V ar) = L0. A particular choice different from V ar for X in the following will be
the set
V ar⋆ := V ar ∪ {φt | φ ∈ LJ , t ∈ Jt}.
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Here, we write L⋆0 := L0(V ar
⋆).
For the following definition, note that any bijection t : V ar → X can be naturally extended to a bijection
t : L0 → L0(X) through recursion on L0 by commuting with ∧,∨,→ and ⊥. Also, such a bijection t : V ar → X
always exists as both X and V ar are countably infinite.
Definition 2.7. Let I be an intermediate logic and let t : V ar → X be some (any) bijection extended to
t : L0 → L0(X). We write I(X) := t[I].
Note, that here also I(V ar) = I.
Remark 2.8. In the above definition, it is indeed not important which bijection f : V ar → X is fixed as I is
closed under substitutions. Further, naturally I(X) is closed under modus ponens and under substitutions of
variables in X by formulae in L0(X).
Given I(X) and Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L0(X), we write Γ ⊢I(X) φ if as before
∃γ1, . . . , γn ∈ Γ
(
n∧
i=1
γi → φ ∈ I(X)
)
.
In the following, we will also write I⋆ for the particular case of I(V ar⋆).
3. Algebraic semantics for intermediate justification logics
We move on to the first main line of semantics for intermediate justification logics studied here, extending
the model-theoretic approaches of Mkrtychev, Fitting as well as Lehmann and Studer to take values in arbitrary
Heyting algebras. The models which we introduce, as well as the techniques used later to prove corresponding
completeness theorems, are similar to those from [34] where completeness theorems of the particular case of
Go¨del justification logics with respect to models over the particular Heyting algebra [0,1]G (see the last section)
were considered.
3.1. Heyting algebras and propositional semantics. We give some preliminaries on Heyting algebras and
their relevant notions as a primer for the later definitions.
Definition 3.1. A Heyting algebra is structure A = 〈A,∧A,∨A,→A, 0A, 1A〉 such that 〈A,∧A,∨A, 0A, 1A〉 is
a bounded lattice with largest element 1A and smallest element 0A and →A is a binary operation with
(1) x→A x = 1A,
(2) x ∧A (x→A y) = x ∧A y,
(3) y ∧A (x→A y) = y,
(4) x→A (y ∧A z) = (x→A y) ∧A (x→A z),
where we write a ≤A b for a ∧A b = a.
Note, that this order ≤A on A is always a partial order. Given a Heyting algebra A, we write ¬Ax := x→A
0A. We call a Heyting algebra A linear if x ≤A y or y ≤A x for all x, y ∈ A. A is called a Boolean algebra, if
x→A y = ¬Ax ∨A y for all x, y ∈ A.
We collect some facts about Heyting algebras which are of use later.
Lemma 3.2. Let A = 〈A,∧A,∨A,→A, 0A, 1A〉 be a Heyting algebra. Then, for all x, y, z, w ∈ A:
(1) x ∧A y ≤A z iff x ≤A y →A z;
(2) x ≤A y iff x→A y = 1A;
(3) 1→A x = x;
(4) if x ≤A y, then y →A z ≤A x→A z;
(5) (x→A y) ∧A (z →A w) ≤A (x ∧A z)→A (y ∧A w).
These properties are quite immediate from the definition of Heyting algebras. For a modern reference on
basic properties of Heyting algebras, see e.g. [33].
Another particular property of Heyting algebras important in this note is that of completeness.
Definition 3.3. A Heyting algebra A is complete if every set X ⊆ A has a join and a meet with respect to
≤A, that is for every X ⊆ A there are sX , iX ∈ A such that:
• ∀x ∈ X : x ≤A sX and if x ≤
A s for all x ∈ X , then sX ≤
A s;
• ∀x ∈ X : iX ≤A x and if i ≤A x for all x ∈ X , then i ≤A iX .
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We denote these (unique) joins and meets, sX and iX , by
∨
X and
∧
X , respectively. Given a class of
Heyting algebras C, we write Cfin for the subclass of all finite algebras and Ccom for the subclass of all complete
Heyting algebras in C. Naturally, every finite Heyting algebra is complete.
Given an (extended) propositional language L0(X), we can give an algebraic interpretation using various
classes of particular Heyting algebras.
Definition 3.4. Let A be a Heyting algebra. A propositional evaluation of L0(X) is a function f : L0(X)→ A
which satisfies the following equations:
(1) f(⊥) = 0A;
(2) f(φ ∧ ψ) = f(φ) ∧A f(ψ);
(3) f(φ ∨ ψ) = f(φ) ∨A f(ψ);
(4) f(φ→ ψ) = f(φ)→A f(ψ).
We denote the set of all A-valued propositional evaluations of L0(X) by Ev(A;L0(X)).
Definition 3.5. Let C be a class of Heyting algebras and Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L0(X). We write Γ ||=C φ if
∀A ∈ C : ∀f ∈ Ev(A;L0(X)) : f [Γ] ⊆ {1
A} implies f(φ) = 1A.
If in particular C = {A}, we write ||=A for the corresponding relation.
Definition 3.6. Let I be an intermediate logic and let X be a set of variables. We say that I(X) is (strongly)
complete with respect to a class C of Heyting algebras if for any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L0(X): Γ ⊢I(X) φ iff Γ ||=C φ.
Although not particularly important for the rest of the paper, every intermediate logic actually has at least
one class of Heyting algebras with respect to which it is strongly complete (namely its variety). We collect this
in the following fact.
Fact 3.7. For every intermediate logic I and any set of variables X, there is a class of Heyting algebras C such
that I(X) is strongly complete with respect to C.
For a modern reference of the proof, see again e.g. [33]. Correspondingly, we introduce the following notation.
We write C ∈ Alg(I(X)), C ∈ Algcom(I(X)) or C ∈ Algfin(I(X)) if C is a class of Heyting algebras, of complete
Heyting algebras or of finite Heyting algebras with respect to which I(X) is strongly complete. Note, that here
C ∈ Alg(I(X)) iff C ∈ Alg(I(Y ))
for arbitrary sets of variables X,Y and similarly for Algcom(I(X)) and Algfin(I(X)).
3.2. Algebraic Mkrtychev models. The first class of semantics which we consider are algebraic Mkrtychev
models. The classical Mkrtychev models were introduced in [30], originally for the logic of proofs, and mark the
first non-provability semantics. The generalization of the Mkrtychev models to the other classical justification
logics J0,JT 0,J 40 is due to Kuznets [22]. In some contexts, especially [4, 25], these models are also called
basic models. The following algebraic models also generalize the work on [0, 1]-valued Mkrtychev models in
[16, 34] for the Go¨del justification logics.
Definition 3.8 (Algebraic Mkrtychev model). Let A be a Heyting algebra. An (A-valued) algebraic Mkrtychev
model is a structure M = 〈A,V〉 such that V : LJ → A fulfils
(1) V(⊥) = 0A,
(2) V(φ ∧ ψ) = V(φ) ∧A V(ψ),
(3) V(φ ∨ ψ) = V(φ) ∨A V(ψ),
(4) V(φ→ ψ) = V(φ)→A V(ψ),
for all φ, ψ ∈ LJ and such that it satisfies
(i) V(t : (φ→ ψ)) ∧A V(s : φ) ≤A V([t · s] : ψ),
(ii) V(t : φ) ∨A V(s : φ) ≤A V([t+ s] : φ),
for all t, s ∈ Jt and φ, ψ ∈ LJ .
We write M |= φ if V(φ) = 1A and M |= Γ if M |= γ for all γ ∈ Γ where Γ ⊆ LJ .
Definition 3.9. Let M = 〈A,V〉 be an A-valued algebraic Mkrtychev model. We call M
(1) factive if V(t : φ) ≤A V(φ), and
(2) introspective if V(t : φ) ≤A V(!t : t : φ).
Definition 3.10. Let C be a class of Heyting algebras. Then:
(1) CAMJ denotes the class of all A-valued Mkrtychev models, for all A ∈ C;
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(2) CAMJT denotes the class of all factive CAMJ-models;
(3) CAMJ4 denotes the class of all introspective CAMJ-models;
(4) CAMJT4 denotes the class of all factive and introspective CAMJ-models.
Definition 3.11. Let A be a Heyting algebra and let M = 〈A,V〉 be an algebraic Mkrtychev model. Further,
let CS be a constant specification (for some proof calculus). We say that M respects CS if V(c : φ) = 1A for
all c : φ ∈ CS.
If C is a class of algebraic Mkrtychev models, then we denote the subclass of all models from C respecting a
constant specification CS by CCS .
Definition 3.12. Let C be a class of algebraic Mkrtychev models and let Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ . We write:
(1) Γ |=C φ if ∀M = 〈A,V〉 ∈ C
(∧A
{V(γ) | γ ∈ Γ} ≤A V(φ)
)
;
(2) Γ |=1
C
φ if ∀M = 〈A,V〉 ∈ C
(
M |= Γ⇒M |= φ
)
.
Lemma 3.13. Let I be an intermediate logic, IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40}, let CS be a constant
specification logic, and let C ∈ Alg(I). For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ :
Γ ⊢IJLCS φ implies Γ |=CAMJLCS φ.
Proof. We only show that ⊢IJL0 φ implies |=CAMJL φ. This already suffices for the strong completeness statement
above by the following argument using the deduction theorem for the respective logics and compactness of the
provability relations:
Γ ⊢IJLCS φ impl. ∃Γ0 ⊆ Γ ∪ CS finite (Γ0 ⊢IJL0 φ)
impl. ∃Γ0 ⊆ Γ ∪ CS finite
(
⊢IJL0
∧
Γ0 → φ
)
impl. ∃Γ0 ⊆ Γ ∪ CS finite
(
|=CAMJL
∧
Γ0 → φ
)
impl. ∃Γ0 ⊆ Γ ∪ CS finite ∀M = 〈A,V〉 ∈ CAMJL
(∧A
{V(γ) | γ ∈ Γ0} ≤
A V(φ)
)
impl. ∀M = 〈A,V〉 ∈ CAMJL
(∧A
{V(γ) | γ ∈ Γ ∪ CS} ≤A V(φ)
)
impl. ∀M = 〈A,V〉 ∈ CAMJLCS
(∧A
{V(γ) | γ ∈ Γ} ≤A V(φ)
)
impl. Γ |=CAMJLCS φ.
We show that ⊢IJL0 φ implies |=CAMJL φ as follows: by the definition of IJL0, it suffices to show that |=CAMJL φ
for φ ∈ I as well as for φ ∈ (J) ∪ (+) or even (depending on the choice of IJL0) φ ∈ (F ) ∪ (I) and that it
is preserved under modus ponens. The latter is immediate. For the former, note that in the case of φ being
a justification axiom, the choice of CAMJL is such that all models satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition
3.8 (validating (J) and (+)) and (depending on IJL0) are factive or introspective given (F ) or (I) and thus
validate those immediately.
If now φ ∈ I, then by definition there is a subsitution σ : V ar → LJ and a formula ψ ∈ I such that φ = σ(ψ).
Let A ∈ C and M = 〈A,V〉 be a CAMJ-model. Then, we may define
f : χ 7→ V(σ(χ))
for χ ∈ L0. By definition of M and properties of σ, we have that f is a well-defined evaluation on A. By the
choice of C, we have that ψ ∈ I implies f(ψ) = 1A and thus V(σ(ψ)) = V(φ) = 1. As M was arbitrary, we have
|=CAMJ φ. 
3.3. Algebraic Fitting models. The second algebraic semantics which we consider is based on algebraic
Fitting models, derived from the fundamental possible-world semantics of Fitting [12, 14] which combined the
earlier work of Mkrtychev on syntactic evaluations with the usual semantics of non-explicit modal logics based
on modal Kripke models. As a generalization, we allow the accessibility, evidence and evaluation functions to
take values in Heyting algebras. We have to restrict to complete Heyting algebras however, as we want certain
algebraic equations to be satisfied which involve infima and suprema. The algebraic Fitting models presented
here again generalize the previously introduced many-valued Fitting models from [16, 34] from the context of
the Go¨del justification logics.
Definition 3.14. Let A be a complete Heyting algebra. An (A-valued) algebraic Fitting model is a structure
M = 〈A,W ,R, E ,V〉 with
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• W 6= ∅,
• R :W ×W → A,
• E :W × Jt× LJ → A,
• V :W ×LJ → A,
such that it fulfills the conditions
(1) V(w,⊥) = 0A,
(2) V(w, φ ∧ φ) = V(w, φ) ∧A V(w,ψ),
(3) V(w, φ ∨ φ) = V(w, φ) ∨A V(w,ψ),
(4) V(w, φ→ φ) = V(w, φ)→A V(w,ψ),
(5) V(w, t : φ) = Ew(t, φ) ∧A
∧A
{R(w, v)→A V(v, φ) | v ∈ W},
for all w ∈ W and such that it satisfies
(i) Ew(t, φ→ ψ) ∧A Ew(s, φ) ≤A Ew(t · s, ψ),
(ii) Ew(t, φ) ∨A Ew(s, φ) ≤A Ew(t+ s, φ).
for all w ∈ W , all t, s ∈ Jt and all φ, ψ ∈ LJ .
We write (M, w) |= φ for V(w, φ) = 1A and (M, w) |= Γ if (M, w) |= γ for all γ ∈ Γ.
Definition 3.15. Let M = 〈A,W ,R, E ,V〉 be an A-valued Fitting model. We call M
(i) reflexive if ∀w ∈ W
(
R(w,w) = 1A
)
,
(ii) transitive if ∀w, v, u ∈ W
(
R(w, v) ∧A R(v, u) ≤A R(w, u)
)
,
(iii) monotone if ∀v, w ∈ W∀t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ LJ
(
Ew(t, φ) ∧A R(w, v) ≤A Ev(t, φ)
)
,
(iv) introspective if it is transitive, monotone and satisfies
Ew(t, φ) ≤
A Ew(!t, t : φ)
for all w ∈ W and all t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ LJ ,
(v) accessibility-crisp if ∀w, v ∈ W
(
R(w, v) ∈ {0A, 1A}
)
.
Definition 3.16. Let C be a class of complete Heyting algebras. Then:
(1) CAFJ denotes the class of all A-valued Fitting models, for all A ∈ C;
(2) CAFJT denotes the class of all reflexive CAFJ-models;
(3) CAFJ4 denotes the class of all introspective CAFJ-models;
(4) CFJT4 denotes the class of all CAFJ4-models which are reflexive.
By Cc, we denote the class of all accessibility-crisp models in C for some class C of algebraic Fitting models.
Definition 3.17. Let A be a complete Heyting algebra and let M = 〈A,W ,R, E ,V〉 be a A-valued algebraic
Fitting model. We say that M respects a constant specification CS (for some proof system) if
V(w, c : φ) = 1A
for all w ∈ W and all c : φ ∈ CS.
Given a class C of algebraic Fitting model, we denote the subclass of all algebraic Fitting models in C
respecting a constant specification CS (for some proof system) by CCS .
Definition 3.18. Let C be a class of algebraic Fitting models and Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ . We write:
(1) Γ |=C φ if ∀M = 〈A,W ,R, E ,V〉 ∈ C∀w ∈ W
(∧A
{V(w, γ) | γ ∈ Γ} ≤A V(w, φ)
)
;
(2) Γ |=1
C
φ if ∀M = 〈A,W ,R, E ,V〉 ∈ C∀w ∈ W
(
(M, w) |= Γ⇒ (M, w) |= φ
)
.
Lemma 3.19. Let I be an intermediate logic and IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40}. Let CS be a constant
specification for IJL0 and let C ∈ Algcom(I). For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ :
Γ ⊢IJLCS φ implies Γ |=CAFJLCS φ.
Proof. As before, we only show ⊢IJL0 φ implies |=CAFJL φ. The argument from the proof of Lemma 3.13 about
how to obtain strong soundness can be straightforwardly adapted to the case of algebraic Fitting models.
To see that ⊢IJL0 φ implies |=CAFJL φ, note that it is again enough to show the claim for φ ∈ I or φ being a
justification axiom (depending on IJL0).
If φ ∈ I, then by the choice of C one may repeat the argument from the proof of Lemma 3.13 locally for
every V(w, ·) with w ∈ W to obtain |=CAFJ φ.
As the algebraic Fitting models are slightly more complex in their evaluation of the justification modalities,
we actually show the validity of the justification axiom schemes in their respective model classes. For this, let
M = 〈A,W ,R, E ,V〉 ∈ CAFJ and let w ∈ W .
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(1) Consider the axiom scheme (J). Then, we have
∧A
{R(w, v)→A V(v, φ→ ψ) | v ∈ W} ∧A
∧A
{R(w, v)→A V(v, φ) | v ∈ W}
≤A
∧A
{R(w, v)→A V(v, ψ) | v ∈ W}
Further we have Ew(t, φ→ ψ) ∧A Ew(s, φ) ≤A Ew(t · s, ψ) by condition (i) of Definition 3.14. Thus:
V(w, t : (φ→ ψ)) ∧A V(w, s : φ)
= Ew(t, φ→ ψ) ∧
A
∧A
{R(w, v)→A V(v, φ→ ψ) | v ∈ W}∧A
Ew(s, φ) ∧
A
∧A
{R(w, v)→A V(v, φ) | v ∈ W}
≤A Ew(t · s, ψ) ∧
A
∧A
{R(w, v)→A V(v, ψ) | v ∈ W}
= V(w, [t · s] : ψ).
The claim follows from the above as by residuation, we have V(w, t : (φ → ψ)) ≤A V(w, s : φ) →A
V(w, [t · s] : ψ).
(2) Consider the axiom scheme (+). We only show V(w, t : φ) ≤A V(w, [t+ s] : φ). The other part follows
similarly. By condition (ii) of Definition 3.14, we have
Ew(t, φ) ≤
A Ew(t, φ) ∨
A Ew(s, φ) ≤
A Ew(t+ s, φ)
and thus
V(w, t : φ) = Ew(t, φ) ∧
A
∧A
{R(w, v)→A V(v, φ) | v ∈ W}
≤A Ew(t+ s, φ) ∧
A
∧A
{R(w, v)→A V(v, φ) | v ∈ W}
= V(w, [t+ s] : φ).
(3) Consider the axiom scheme (F ) and assume that M is reflexive. We have R(w,w) = 1A and thus:
V(w, t : φ) = Ew(t, φ) ∧
A
∧A
{R(w, v)→A V(v, φ) | v ∈ W}
≤A
∧A
{R(w, v)→A V(v, φ) | v ∈ W}
≤A R(w,w)→A V(w, φ)
= V(w, φ).
(4) Consider the axiom scheme (I). Assume that M is introspective. By the transitivity of R, we have at
first∧A
{R(w, u)→A V(u, φ) | u ∈ W} ≤A R(w, v)→A
∧A
{R(v, u)→A V(u, φ) | u ∈ W}.
To see this, note that we have
R(w, v) ∧A
∧A
{R(w, u)→A V(u, φ) | u ∈ W} ≤A R(w, v) ∧A
(
R(w, u)→A V(u, φ)
)
≤A R(w, v) ∧A
((
R(w, v) ∧A R(v, u)
)
→A V(u, φ)
)
= R(w, v) ∧A
(
R(w, v)→A (R(v, u))→A V(u, φ)
)
≤A R(w, u)→A V(u, φ)
for all u ∈ W . By taking the infimum over u, we have
R(w, v) ∧A
∧A
{R(w, u)→A V(u, φ) | u ∈ W} ≤A
∧A
{R(v, u)→A V(u, φ) | u ∈ W}.
Further, we have by monotonicity that
Ew(t, φ) ≤
A R(w, v)→A Ev(t, φ).
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Therefore, we have
V(w, t : φ) = Ew(t, φ) ∧
A
∧A
{R(w, u)→A V(u, φ) | u ∈ W}
≤A
(
R(w, v)→A Ev(t, φ)
)
∧A
(
R(w, v)→A
∧A
{R(v, u)→A V(u, φ) | u ∈ W}
)
≤A R(w, v)→A
(
Ev(t, φ) ∧
A
∧A
{R(v, u)→A V(u, φ) | u ∈ W}
)
= R(w, v)→A V(v, t : φ).
By taking the infimum, we have
Ew(t, φ) ∧
A
∧A
{R(w, u)→A V(u, φ) | u ∈ W} ≤A
∧A
{R(w, v)→A V(v, t : φ) | v ∈ W}.
Thus, we have for any v ∈ W by introspectivity:
V(w, t : φ) ≤A Ew(!t, t : φ) ∧
A
∧A
{R(w, v)→A V(v, t : φ) | v ∈ W}
= V(w, !t : t : φ).

3.4. Algebraic subset models. The last algebraic semantics which we consider is based on algebraic gener-
alizations of the subset models for classical justification logic by Lehmann and Studer [26]. Similar as with the
previous algebraic Fitting models, we allow all involved functions to take arbitrary values in Heyting algebras,
again restricting ourselves to complete Heyting algebras to be able to formulate certain regularity conditions.
Definition 3.20 (Algebraic subset model). LetA be a complete Heyting algebra with domain A. An (A-valued)
algebraic subset model is a structure M = 〈A,W ,W0, E ,V〉 with
• W 6= ∅,
• W0 ⊆ W , W0 6= ∅,
• E : Jt×W ×W → A,
• V :W ×LJ → A,
such that for all w ∈ W0, V fulfills the conditions
(1) V(w,⊥) = 0A,
(2) V(w, φ ∧ ψ) = V(w, φ) ∧A V(w,ψ),
(3) V(w, φ ∨ ψ) = V(w, φ) ∨A V(w,ψ),
(4) V(w, φ→ ψ) = V(w, φ)→A V(w,ψ),
(5) V(w, t : φ) =
∧A
{Et(w, v)→A V(v, φ) | v ∈ W},
and such that it is regular, that is for all w ∈ W0:
(i) Es+t(w, v) ≤A Es(w, v) ∧A Et(w, v) for all v ∈ W ;
(ii) for all v ∈ W :
Es·t(w, v) ≤
A
∧A
{Mws,t(ψ)→
A V(v, ψ) | ψ ∈ LJ}
with
Mws,t(ψ) :=
∨A
{V(w, s : (φ→ ψ)) ∧A V(w, t : φ) | φ ∈ LJ}.
We write (M, w) |= φ for V(w, φ) = 1A and (M, w) |= Γ for V(w, γ) = 1A for all γ ∈ Γ.
The function E is actually a straightforward A-valued generalization of the E-function from [26] as it is in
fact nothing more than a different representation of the function
E : Jt×W → AW
which maps terms and worlds to A-valued subsets of W .
Definition 3.21. Let M = 〈A,W ,W0, E ,V〉 be an A-valued subset model. We call M
(i) reflexive if ∀w ∈ W0∀t ∈ Jt
(
Et(w,w) = 1A
)
,
(ii) introspective if ∀w ∈ W0∀v ∈ W∀t ∈ Jt
(
E!t(w, v) ≤A
∧A
{V(w, t : φ)→A V(v, t : φ) | φ ∈ LJ}
)
,
(iii) accessibility-crisp if ∀t ∈ Jt∀w, v ∈ W0
(
Et(w, v) ∈ {0
A, 1A}
)
.
Definition 3.22. Let C be a class of complete Heyting algebras. Then:
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(1) CASJ denotes the class of all A-valued subset models, for all A ∈ C;
(2) CASJT denotes the class of all A-valued reflexive subset models, for all A ∈ C;
(3) CASJ4 denotes the class of all A-valued introspective subset models, for all A ∈ C;
(4) CASJT4 denotes the class of all A-valued reflexive and introspective subset models, for all A ∈ C.
Given a class C of algebraic subset models, we denote the class of all accessibility-crisp models in C by Cc.
Definition 3.23. Let A be a complete Heyting algebra and let M = 〈A,W ,W0, E ,V〉 be a A-valued algebraic
subset model. Further, let CS be a constant specification (for some proof calculus). We say that M respects
CS if V(w, c : φ) = 1A for all c : φ ∈ CS and all w ∈ W0.
Given a class C of algebraic subset models, we write CCS for the class of all models from C which respect
CS. As before, there are two natural consequence relations to consider here.
Definition 3.24. Let Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ and C be a class of algebraic subset models. We write
(1) Γ |=C φ if ∀M = 〈A,W ,W0, E ,V〉 ∈ C∀w ∈ W0
(∧A
{V(w, γ) | γ ∈ Γ} ≤A V(w, φ)
)
;
(2) Γ |=1
C
φ if ∀M = 〈A,W ,W0, E ,V〉 ∈ C∀w ∈ W0
(
(M, w) |= Γ⇒ (M, w) |= φ
)
.
We write Γ |=AJL φ or Γ |=1AJL φ for Γ |={A}JL φ or Γ |=
1
{A}JL φ, respectively.
Lemma 3.25. Let I be an intermediate logic and IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40}. Further, let CS be a
constant specification for IJL0 and let C ∈ Algcom(I). For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , we have:
Γ ⊢IJLCS φ implies Γ |=CASJLCS φ.
Proof. By the same reasoning as in Lemmas 3.13 and 3.13, we only show ⊢IJL0 φ implies |=CASJL φ. Similarly,
it suffices to show the claim for φ ∈ I as well as the justifications axioms (based on IJL0).
We may repeat the argument from the previous soundness proofs that φ ∈ I implies |=CASJ φ by constructing
a similar propositional evaluation f locally for every V(w, ·) over every w ∈ W0.
We thus only show the validity of (1) (J), (2) (+), (3) (F ) and (4) (4) in their respective model classes. For
this, let M = 〈A,W ,W0, E ,V〉 be a CASJLCS-model and let w ∈ W0.
(1) We show
(†) V(w, t : (φ→ ψ)) ∧A V(w, s : φ) ≤A V(w, [t · s] : ψ).
For this, let v ∈ W . We then have
V(w, t : (φ→ ψ)) ∧A V(w, s : φ) ≤A
∨A
{V(w, t : (φ→ ψ)) ∧A V(w, s : φ) | φ ∈ LJ}
≤A Et·s(w, v)→
A V(v, ψ)
through condition (ii) of Definition 3.20. Therefore, we have
V(w, t : (φ→ ψ)) ∧A V(w, s : φ) ≤A
∧A
{Et·s(w, v)→
A V(v, ψ) | v ∈ W} = V(w, [t · s] : ψ)
as v was arbitrary, which is (†).
(2) Let v ∈ W . We have
V(w, t : φ) =
∧A
{Et(w, u)→
A V(u, φ) | u ∈ W}
≤A Et(w, v)→
A V(v, φ)
≤A Et+s(w, v)→
A V(v, φ)
through condition (i) in Definition 3.20. As v was arbitrary, we have
V(w, t : φ) ≤A
∧A
{Et+s(w, v)→
A V(v, φ) | v ∈ W} = V(w, [t+ s] : φ).
One shows similarly that V(w, s : φ) ≤A V(w, [t+ s] : φ).
(3) M is reflexive by assumption. Therefore, we have Et(w,w) = 1A as w ∈ W0 and thus
V(w, t : φ) =
∧A
{Et(w, v)→
A V(v, φ) | v ∈ W}
≤A Et(w,w)→
A V(w, φ)
≤A V(w, φ).
Therefore, V(w, t : φ)→A V(w, φ) = 1.
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(4) M is introspective by assumption. Thus, we have
V(w, t : φ) ≤A E!t(w, v)→
A V(v, t : φ)
for any v ∈ W by the introspectivity and we have therefore:
V(w, t : φ) ≤A
∧A
{E!t(w, v)→
A V(v, t : φ) | v ∈ W} = V(w, !t : t : φ).

4. Completeness for algebraic semantics
To approach completeness, we translate the language LJ to L⋆0 by introducing the translation
⋆ : LJ → L
⋆
0
using recursion on LJ with the following clauses:
• ⊥⋆ := ⊥;
• p⋆ := p;
• (φ ◦ ψ)⋆ := φ⋆ ◦ ψ⋆ with ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,→};
• (t : φ)⋆ := φt.
Using the above translation, we can convert formulae containing justification modalities into formulae of L⋆0
and use semantic results for the intermediate logic in question over L⋆0 to derive results for the corresponding
intermediate justification logic. This approach, especially in the context of algebra-valued modal logics, goes
back to Caicedo and Rodriguez work [6] (see also [39]) and was previously also applied in the context of many-
valued justification logics (see [34]).
For this, the following lemma provides a way to interpret modal systems in extended propositional systems.
For this, given a proof calculus S over a language L, we write ThS := {φ ∈ L | ⊢S φ}.
Lemma 4.1. Let I be an intermediate logic and IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40} and CS be a constant
specification for IJL0. For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ :
Γ ⊢IJLCS φ iff Γ
⋆ ∪ (ThIJLCS )
⋆ ⊢I⋆ φ
⋆.
Proof. We prove both directions separately. In any way, recall that ⋆ is a bijection between LJ and L⋆0.
For the direction from left to right, notice that it suffices to show Γ⋆ ∪ (ThIJLCS )
⋆ ⊢I⋆ φ⋆ for
(i) φ ∈ Γ, or
(ii) φ ∈ CS, or
(iii) φ ∈ IJL0,
and that it is preserved under modus ponens. The latter is obvious by definition of ⋆. For (i) of the former, we
have φ⋆ ∈ Γ⋆ and thus Γ⋆∪(ThIJLCS )
⋆ ⊢I⋆ φ
⋆. For (ii) and (iii), we have ⊢IJLCS φ, and thus φ
⋆ ∈ (ThIJLCS )
⋆.
This gives again Γ⋆ ∪ (ThIJLCS )
⋆ ⊢I⋆ φ⋆.
For the direction from right to left, note that also here it suffices to show Γ ⊢IJLCS φ for
(a) φ⋆ ∈ Γ⋆, or
(b) φ⋆ ∈ (ThIJLCS )
⋆, or
(c) φ⋆ ∈ I⋆,
and that also here, it is preserved under modus ponens. The latter is again immediate. For (a) of the former,
we have φ ∈ Γ which gives Γ ⊢IJLCS φ directly. For (b), we have ⊢IJLCS φ by definition. For (c), we have
φ ∈ I. To see this, note that by the definition of I⋆ = I(L⋆0), we have φ
⋆ = σ(ψ) for some ψ ∈ I and some
bijection t : V ar → V ar⋆. Now, the function
σt : p 7→
{
q if t(p) = q
s : φ if t(p) = φs
is a substitution from V ar to LJ and we have
φ = σt(ψ).
Thus, we have φ ∈ I and thus φ ∈ IJL0, i.e. Γ ⊢IJLCS φ. 
The rest of this section is devoted countermodel constructions, converting algebraic evaluations of L⋆0 into
corresponding algebraic Mkrtychev, Fitting or subset models and deriving corresponding completeness results
for the intermediate justification logics from this.
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4.1. Completeness w.r.t. algebraic Mkrtychev models.
Definition 4.2. Let I be an intermediate logic and let IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40} where CS is
a constant specification for IJL0. Let A be a Heyting algebra and v ∈ Ev(A;L⋆0). The canonical algebraic
Mkrtychev model w.r.t. A and v is the structure Mc,M
A,v (IJ LCS) = 〈A,V
c〉 defined by:
Vc(φ) := v(φ⋆).
Lemma 4.3. For any Heyting algebra A, any v ∈ Ev(A;L⋆0) with v[(ThIJLCS )
⋆] ⊆ {1A} and any choice of
IJLCS, M
c,M
A,v (IJLCS) is a well-defined A-valued algebraic Fitting model. Further:
(a) if (F ) is an axiom scheme of IJLCS, then M
c,M
A,v (IJ LCS) is factive;
(b) if (I) is an axiom scheme of IJLCS, then M
c,M
A,v (IJLCS) is introspective.
Proof. As v ∈ Ev(A;L⋆0), we have items (1) - (4) from Definition 3.8. Then, as additionally v[(ThIJLCS )
⋆] ⊆
{1A}, we have
Vc(t : (φ→ ψ)) ∧A Vc(s : φ) = v((φ→ ψ)t) ∧
A v(φs)
≤A v(ψ[t·s])
= Vc([t · s] : ψ)
and
Vc(t : φ) ∨A Vc(s : φ) = v(φt) ∨
A v(φs)
≤A v(φ[t+s])
= Vc([t+ s] : φ)
regarding items (i) and (ii) of Definition 3.8. Now, regarding (a), if (F ) is an axiom scheme of IJLCS , we
naturally have
Vc(t : φ) = v(φt) ≤ v(φ
⋆) = Vc(φ).
As for item (b), if (I) is an axiom scheme of IJLCS, we have
Vc(t : φ) = v(φt) ≤
A v((t : φ)!t) = V
c(!t : t : φ).

Theorem 4.4. Let I be an intermediate logic and let IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40} where CS is a
constant specification for IJL0. Further, let C ∈ Alg(I).
For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , the following are equivalent:
(1) Γ ⊢IJLCS φ;
(2) Γ |=CAMJLCS φ;
(3) Γ |=1
CAMJLCS
φ.
Proof. (1) implies (2) comes from Lemma 3.13 and (2) implies (3) is natural. For (3) implies (1), suppose
Γ 6⊢IJLCS φ. Then, by Lemma 4.1, we have
Γ⋆ ∪ (ThIJLCS )
⋆ 6⊢I⋆ φ
⋆
which gives that there exists a A ∈ C and v ∈ Ev(A;L⋆0) such that
v[Γ⋆] ⊆ {1A}, v[(ThIJLCS )
⋆] ⊆ {1A} and v(φ) < 1A
by assumption on C. By Lemma 4.3, we have that Mc,M
A,v(IJLCS) is a well-defined CAMJL-model and by
definition, it follows that:
M |= Γ and M 6|= φ.
Also, Mc,M
A,v (IJLCS) respects CS. As we have ⊢IJLCS c : φ for c : φ ∈ CS, we have φc ∈ (ThIJLCS )
⋆ and
thus v(φc) = 1
A. By definition, we have
Vc(c : φ) = v(φc) = 1
A.
Thus, we have Γ 6|=1
CAMJLCS
φ. 
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4.2. Completeness w.r.t. algebraic Fitting models.
Definition 4.5. Let I be an intermediate propositional logic and let IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40}
where CS is a constant specification for IJL0. Let A be a complete Heyting algebra. The canonical algebraic
Fitting model w.r.t. A is the structure Mc,F
A
(IJ LCS) = 〈A,W
c,Wc0 , E
c,Vc〉 defined as follows:
• Wc := {v ∈ Ev(A;L⋆0) | v[(ThIJLCS )
⋆] ⊆ {1A}};
• Rc(v, w); =
{
1A if ∀t ∈ Jt∀φ ∈ LJ
(
v(φt) ≤A w(φ⋆)
)
;
0A otherwise;
• Ecv(t, φ) := v(φt);
• Vc(v, φ) := v(φ⋆).
Lemma 4.6. For any complete Heyting algebra A and any choice of IJLCS, M
c,F
A
(IJ LCS) is a well-defined
A-valued algebraic Fitting model. Further:
(a) if (F ) is an axiom scheme of IJLCS, then M
c,F
A
(IJLCS) is reflexive;
(b) if (I) is an axiom scheme of IJLCS, then M
c,F
A
(IJLCS) is introspective.
Proof. Condition (1) - (4) from Definition 3.14 follow immediately for any v ∈ Wc as v ∈ Ev(A;L⋆0) and by the
definition of ⋆. For item (5), we have
v(φt) ≤
A w(φ⋆)
for any w ∈ Wc with Rc(v, w) = 1A. Thus, we have
v(φt) ≤
A
∧A
{w(φ⋆) | w ∈ Wc,Rc(v, w) = 1A} =
∧A
{Rc(v, w)→A w(φ⋆) | w ∈ Wc}.
Therefore
Ecv(t, φ) ∧
A
∧A
{Rc(v, w)→A w(φ⋆) | w ∈ Wc} = v(φt).
For item (i), note that
Ecv(t, φ→ ψ) ∧
A Ecv(s, φ) = v((φ→ ψ)t) ∧
A v(φs)
≤A v(ψ[t·s])
= Ecv(t · s, ψ)
where the inequality follows using the axiom scheme (J) as v[(ThIJLCS )
⋆] ⊆ {1A} and v ∈ Ev(A;L⋆0).
For item (ii), note that
Ecv(t, φ) = v(φt) ≤
A v(φ[t+s]) = E
c
v(t+ s, φ)
and similarly for s through the axiom scheme (+) as again v[(ThIJLCS )
⋆] ⊆ {1A} and v ∈ Ev(A;L⋆0). Thus,
we have
Ecv(t, φ) ∨
A Ecv(s, φ) ≤
A Ecv(t+ s, φ).
On to item (a), if (F ) is an axiom scheme of IJLCS , then we naturally have
v(φt) ≤
A v(φ⋆)
for any φ ∈ LJ and any t ∈ Jt. Thus, especially we have Rc(v, v) = 1A by definition and thus Rc is reflexive.
For item (b), note at first that by the axiom scheme (I), we have
Ecv(t, φ) = v(φt) ≤
A v((t : φ)!t) = E
c
v(!t, t : φ)
for any φ ∈ LJ and any t ∈ Jt by definition of the canonical model. Further, we have that Rc is transitive. For
this, let Rc(v, w) = Rc(w, u) = 1A. Then, we have for any φ ∈ LJ and any t ∈ Jt:
v(φt) ≤
A v((t : φ)!t) ≤
A w(φt) ≤
A u(φ⋆)
and thus Rc(v, u) = 1A. For the property of monotonicity, suppose Rc(v, w) = 1A. Then, we have
Ecv(t, φ) = v(φt) ≤
A v((t : φ)!t) ≤
A w(φt) = E
c
w(t, φ)
which is monotonicity. 
Theorem 4.7. Let I be an intermediate logic and let IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40} where CS is a
constant specification for IJL0. Further, let C ∈ Algcom(I).
For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , the following are equivalent:
(1) Γ ⊢IJLCS φ;
(2) Γ |=CAFJLCS φ;
(3) Γ |=1
CAFJLCS
φ;
(4) Γ |=1
CAFJLcCS
φ.
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Proof. Again, (1) implies (2) follows from Lemma 3.19 and (2) implies (3) as well as (3) implies (4) are obvious.
Thus, suppose Γ 6⊢IJLCS φ. Then, by Lemma 4.1, we have that
Γ⋆ ∪ (ThIJLCS )
⋆ 6⊢G⋆ φ
⋆.
By the assumption on C, we have that there exists a A ∈ C and a v ∈ Ev(A,L⋆0) such that
v[Γ⋆] ⊆ {1A}, v[(ThIJLCS )
⋆] ⊆ {1A} but v(φ⋆) 6= 1A.
Thus, by definition of Mc,F
A
(IJ LCS), we have v ∈ Wc. Further, by definition we have
Vc(v, γ) = 1A for all γ ∈ Γ
but Vc(v, φ) 6= 1A. Using Lemma 4.6, Mc,F
A
(IJLCS) is again a well-defined CAFJL-model and as before, it
respects CS. Thus, we have
Γ 6|=1CAFJLcCS φ
as Mc,F
A
(IJLCS) is accessibility-crisp. 
4.3. Completeness w.r.t. algebraic subset models.
Definition 4.8. Let I be an intermediate propositional logic and let IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40}
where CS is a constant specification for IJL0. Let A be a complete Heyting algebra. The canonical algebraic
subset model w.r.t. A is the structure Mc,S
A
(IJLCS) = 〈A,Wc,Wc0 , E
c,Vc〉 defined as follows:
• Wc := ALJ ;
• Wc0 := {v ∈ Ev(A;L
⋆
0) | v[(ThIJLCS )
⋆] ⊆ {1A}};
• Ect (v, w) :=
{
1A if ∀φ ∈ LJ
(
v(φt) ≤A w(φ⋆)
)
;
0A otherwise;
• Vc(v, φ) := v(φ⋆).
Lemma 4.9. For any complete Heyting algebra A and any choice of IJLCS, M
c,S
A
(IJLCS) is well-defined
A-valued algebraic subset model. Further:
(a) if (F ) is an axiom scheme of IJLCS, then M
c,S
A
(IJLCS) is reflexive;
(b) if (I) is an axiom scheme of IJLCS, then M
c,S
A
(IJLCS) is introspective.
Proof. To show that Mc
A
(IJ LCS) is well-defined, we have to verify the conditions (1) - (5) and (i), (ii) from
Definition 3.20. For this, let v ∈ Wc0 . We only show (5) from the former, as (1) - (4) follows naturally from
v ∈ Ev(A;L⋆0).
For (5), we show the equality in two steps. At first, note that∧A
{Ect (v, w)→
A Vc(w, φ) | w ∈ Wc} =
∧A
{Ect (v, w)→
A w(φ⋆) | w ∈ Wc}
=
∧A
{w(φ⋆) | w ∈ Wc, Ect (v, w) = 1
A}.
Now, by definition we have
Vc(v, t : φ) = v(φt) ≤
A w(φ⋆)
for any w ∈ Wc. Thus, we naturally have
Vc(v, t : φ) ≤A
∧A
{w(φ⋆) | w ∈ Wc, Ect (v, w) = 1
A}.
For the other direction, consider
vt : LJ → A,ψ
⋆ 7→ ψt.
Then, we have that vt ∈ Wc and further
v(ψt) ≤
A vt(φ
⋆)
by definition. Thus Ect (v, vt) = 1
A and therefore∧A
{w(φ⋆) | w ∈ Wc, Ect (v, w) = 1
A} ≤A vt(φ
⋆) = v(φt).
Let further w ∈ Wc.
(i) Suppose Ect+s(v, w) = 1
A. Then, we have (as v ∈ Ev(A;L⋆0) and v[(ThIJLCS )
⋆] ⊆ {1A})
v(φt) ≤
A v(φ[t+s]) ≤
A w(φ⋆)
through axiom scheme (+) for any φ ∈ LJ and similarly for v(φs). Thus, we have E
c
s (v, w) = E
c
t (v, w) =
1A.
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(ii) Suppose Ect·s(v, w) = 1
A. We write (Mc)vt,s as a shorthand for (M
c,S
A
(IJLCS))
v
t,s. Then to show
(Mc)vt,s(ψ) ≤
A w(ψ⋆)
for every ψ ∈ LJ , it suffices to show (for an arbitrary ψ ∈ LJ):
(†) (Mc)vt,s(ψ) ≤
A v(ψt·s).
(†) however follows from
(Mc)vt,s(ψ) =
∨A
{Vc(v, t : (φ→ ψ)) ∧A Vc(v, s : φ) | φ ∈ LJ}
=
∨A
{v((φ→ ψ)t) ∧
A v(φs) | φ ∈ LJ}
≤A v(ψt·s).
It remains to show items (a) and (b).
(a) Assume that (F ) is an axiom scheme of IJLCS . Let v ∈ Wc0 and let t ∈ Jt. We then have naturally
that
v(φ⋆ → ψ⋆) ∧A v(φ⋆) ≤A v(ψ⋆)
for any φ, ψ ∈ LJ as v ∈ Ev(A;L⋆0). Now, using that (F ) is an axiom scheme of IJLCS , we have for
any φ ∈ LJ that
v(φt → φ
⋆) = 1A
through v[(ThIJLCS )
⋆] ⊆ {1A} and thus
v(φt) ≤
A v(φ⋆)
as v ∈ Ev(A;L⋆0) again. This gives E
c
t (v, v) = 1
A.
(b) Assume that (I) is an axiom scheme of IJLCS and let again v ∈ W
c
0 , w ∈ W
c and t ∈ Jt. Assume
E!t(v, w) = 1A and let φ ∈ LJ be arbitrary. We have, as
v(φt) ≤
A v((t : φ)!t)
through v ∈ Wc0 , that
V (v, t : φ) = v(φt)
≤A v((t : φ)!t)
≤A w(φt)
= V (w, t : φ)
where the last inequality follows from E!t(v, w) = 1A.

Theorem 4.10. Let I be an intermediate logic and let IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40} where CS is a
constant specification for IJL0. Let further C ∈ Algcom(I)
For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , the following are equivalent:
(1) Γ ⊢IJLCS φ;
(2) Γ |=CASJLCS φ;
(3) Γ |=1
CASJLCS
φ;
(4) Γ |=1
CASJLcCS
φ.
Proof. (1) implies (2) comes from Lemma 3.25. (2) implies (3) and (3) implies (4) is obvious. So, assume that
Γ 6⊢IJLCS φ. Through Lemma 4.1, we first have
Γ⋆ ∪ (ThIJLCS )
⋆ 6⊢I⋆ φ
⋆
By the choice of C, there is a complete Heyting algebra A ∈ C with an evaluation v ∈ Ev(A;L⋆0) such that
(†) v[Γ⋆] ∪ v[(ThIJLCS )
⋆] ⊆ {1A} but v(φ⋆) 6= 1A.
By Lemma 4.9, we have that Mc,S
A
(IJLCS) ∈ CASJL through (†). Also M
c,S
A
(IJLCS) naturally respects CS
and is accessibility-crisp. Further, through (†) and the definition of Mc,S
A
(IJ LCS), we have
Vc(v, γ) = 1A for all γ ∈ Γ but Vc(v, φ) 6= 1A
and thus again per definition Γ 6|=1
CASJLcCS
φ. 
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5. Frame semantics for intermediate justification logics
As a second semantic approach, we extend not Heyting algebras but intuitionistic Kripke frames for inter-
mediate logics with the semantic machinery of the models of Mkrtychev, Fitting or of Lehmann and Studer.
This extends the work on intuitionistic Mkrtychev and Fitting models (under different terminology) from
Marti and Studer in [27] to wider classes of logics. The intuitionistic subset models based on Kripke frames
introduced later are completely new in the literature.
5.1. Kripke frames and propositional semantics. We review some concepts from Kripke frames for propo-
sitional intermediate logics (see e.g. [15, 31]). For this, we need some terminology from the context of the theory
of partial orders first.
Definition 5.1. We call a partial order, that is a structure 〈F,≤〉 such that ≤ is a binary relation on the
non-empty set F which satisfies the conditions
(1) x ≤ x (reflexivity),
(2) x ≤ y and y ≤ x implies x = y (antisymmetry),
(3) x ≤ y and y ≤ z implies x ≤ z (transitivity),
for all x, y, z ∈ F , a Kripke frame.
A set X ⊆ F is called a cone (or upset), if
∀x ∈ X∀y ∈ F (x ≤ y ⇒ y ∈ X) .
We denote the smallest cone containing a set X of a partial order 〈F,≤〉 by ↑ X . A cone X is called principal
if X =↑ {x} for some element x. It is straightforward that
↑ {x} = {y ∈ F | y ≥ x}
and that
↑ X =
⋃
x∈X
↑ {x}.
A Kripke frame G = 〈G,≤′〉 is an (induced) subframe of a Kripke frame F = 〈F,≤〉, if G ⊆ F and ≤′=≤
∩(G ×G). In this case, we also write G = F ↾ G. A Kripke frame is called principal if its domain is principal.
Definition 5.2. Let F = 〈F,≤〉 be a Kripke frame. A (L0(X)-)Kripke model based on F is a structure
M = 〈F,〉 with ⊆ F ×X which satisfies
x ≤ y and x  p implies y  p
for all p ∈ X .
A Kripke model N = 〈G,′〉 is called an (induced) submodel of a Kripke model M = 〈F,〉 if G is an induced
subframe of F and for all p ∈ X :
{x ∈ G | x ′ p} = {x ∈ F | x  p} ∩G.
We write N = M ↾ G in this case.
Given a Kripke model M = 〈F,〉, we introduce the satisfaction relation |= for formulae from L0(X) as
follows. Given a x ∈ F , we define recursively:
• (M, x) 6|= ⊥;
• (M, x) |= p if x  p;
• (M, x) |= φ ∧ ψ if (M, x) |= φ and (M, x) |= ψ;
• (M, x) |= φ ∨ ψ if (M, x) |= φ or (M, x) |= ψ;
• (M, x) |= φ→ ψ if ∀y ∈ F (x ≤ y ⇒ (M, x) 6|= φ or (M, x) |= ψ).
We write M |= φ if (M, x) |= φ for any x ∈ F , (M, x) |= Γ if (M, x) |= γ for all γ ∈ Γ and M |= Γ if (M, x) |= Γ
for all x ∈ F .
A fundamental property of Kripke models is that the monotonicity of propositional variables extends to all
formulae. More precisely, we have the following:
Lemma 5.3. Let M = 〈F,〉 be a L0(X) Kripke model. Then, for all φ ∈ L0(X) and all x, y ∈ F :
x ≤ y and (M, x) |= φ implies (M, y) |= φ.
The proof is an easy induction on the structure of L0(X). Given a class of Kripke frames C, we write
M0(C;L0(X)) for the class of all Kripke models over L0(X) with underlying Kripke frames from C. Given a
single frame F, we also write M0(F;L0(X)) for M0({F};L0(X)).
Using these definitions, there are now two definitions of consequence to consider.
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Definition 5.4. Let Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L0(X) and C be a class of Kripke models. Then, we write:
(1) Γ |=C φ if ∀M ∈ C∀x ∈ D(M)
(
(M, x) |= Γ⇒ (M, x) |= φ
)
;
(2) Γ |=g
C
φ if ∀M ∈ C
(
M |= Γ⇒M |= φ
)
.
Further, if C is now a class of Kripke frames, we write:
(3) Γ |=C φ if Γ |=M0(C;L0(X)) φ;
(4) Γ |=g
C
φ if Γ |=gM0(C;L0(X)) φ.
Definition 5.5. Let I be an intermediate logic, X a countably infinite set of variables and C be a class of
Kripke frames.
(1) We say that I(X) is strongly complete w.r.t. C if Γ ⊢I(X) φ iff Γ |=C φ.
(2) We say that I(X) is strongly globally complete w.r.t. C if Γ ⊢I(X) φ iff Γ |=
g
C
φ.
Given a class of Kripke frames C, we write C ∈ KFr(I) or C ∈ KFrg(I) if I is strongly (locally) complete or
strongly globally complete w.r.t. C, respectively. We also write C ∈ KFr(I) ∩ KFrg(I) for C ∈ KFr(I) and
C ∈ KFrg(I).
The global version will later prove to be important in the completeness considerations. Two things shall
be noted in this context. First, it is well known that there are Kripke incomplete intermediate logics, that is
intermediate logics where there is no class of Kripke frames for which the logic is (even weakly) complete. This
is (well-known to be) connected with the corresponding problem of Kripke incomplete modal logics and the
first such logic was constructed in [37]. All following considerations involving propositional completeness w.r.t.
classes of Kripke frames thus implicitly assume that such a class exists.
Further, if an intermediate logic is characterized by a class of Kripke frames locally, there is a simple extended
class of frames which characterizes the logic globally. More precisely, we have the following:
Lemma 5.6. Let C be a class of Kripke frames and let C be the closure of C under principal subframes. Let
Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L0(X). Then, we have:
(1) Γ |=C φ iff Γ |=C φ;
(2) Γ |=
C
φ iff Γ |=g
C
φ.
Proof. For (1), we have naturally the direction from right to left. For the converse, note that for all φ ∈ L0, all
M over frames from C and all x ∈ D(M), we have
(M, x) |= φ iff (M ↾ (↑ {x}), x) |= φ.
Thus, the claim follows from the fact that for every F ∈ C, we have F ∈ C or F = G ↾ (↑ {x}) for some G ∈ C
and some x ∈ D(G).
For (2), we naturally have the direction from left to right. For the converse, consider Γ |=g
C
φ, that is
∀N ∈M0(C;L0)
(
N |= Γ⇒ N |= φ
)
.
Let F ∈ C and M ∈M0(F;L0) as well as x ∈ F and suppose (M, x) |= Γ. Consider
M′ := M ↾ (↑ {x}).
Then, we have M′ |= Γ by Lemma 5.3 and as M′ ∈ M0(C,L0) as C is closed under principal subframes. We
thus have M′ |= φ by Γ |=g
C
φ, i.e. especially (M, x) |= φ. Thus, we have Γ |=C φ. 
5.2. Intuitionistic Mkrtychev models. We continue our semantical investigations into intermediate justifi-
cation logics by extending the approach of Mkrtychevs syntactic models by intuitionistic Kripke frames. These
intuitionistic Mkrtychev models are akin to the previously considered models from [27] for IPCJ T 4 (under the
name of intuitionistic basic models).
Definition 5.7. Let F = 〈F,≤〉 be a Kripke frame. An intuitionistic Mkrtychev model based on F is a structure
M = 〈F, E ,〉 such that ⊆ F × V ar and E : Jt× F → 2LJ satisfy
(1) x ≤ y and x  p implies y  p for all p ∈ V ar,
(2) x ≤ y and φ ∈ Et(x) implies φ ∈ Et(x) for all φ ∈ LJ and all t ∈ Jt,
for all x, y ∈ F as well as
(i) Et(x) ⊐ Es(x) ⊆ E[t·s](x) for all x ∈ F and all t, s ∈ Jt,
(ii) Et(x) ∪ Es(x) ⊆ E[t+s](x) for all x ∈ F and all t, s ∈ Jt,
where
Γ ⊐ ∆ := {φ ∈ LJ | ψ → φ ∈ Γ, ψ ∈ ∆ for some ψ ∈ LJ}
for Γ,∆ ⊆ LJ .
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Given an intuitionistic Mkrtychev model M over a Kripke frame F = 〈F,≤〉, we also write D(M) := F and
call F the domain of M. Note that we use F to denote the domain of a model but also (F ) to denote the axiom
scheme of factivity for the intermediate justification logics.
Over an intuitionistic Mkrtychev model M = 〈F, E ,〉, we introduce the following local satisfaction relation
by recursion:
• (M, x) 6|= ⊥;
• (M, x) |= p if x  p;
• (M, x) |= φ ∧ ψ if (M, x) |= φ and (M, x) |= ψ;
• (M, x) |= φ ∨ ψ if (M, x) |= φ or (M, x) |= ψ;
• (M, x) |= φ→ ψ if ∀y ∈ F (x ≤ y ⇒ (M, x) 6|= φ or (M, x) |= ψ);
• (M, x) |= t : φ if φ ∈ Et(x).
We write (M, x) |= Γ if (M, x) |= γ for all γ ∈ Γ. Further, we have the following immediate lemma.
Lemma 5.8. Let F = 〈F,≤〉 be a Kripke frame and let M be a intuitionistic Mkrtychev model over F. For any
φ ∈ LJ and all x, y ∈ F :
x ≤ y and (M, x) |= φ implies (M, y) |= φ.
Definition 5.9. Let F = 〈F,≤〉 be a Kripke frame and M = 〈F, E ,〉 be an intuitionistic Mkrtychev model.
We call M
(1) factive if φ ∈ Et(x) implies (M, x) |= φ, and
(2) introspective if t : Et(x) ⊆ E!t(x) where t : Γ = {t : γ | γ ∈ Γ}.
Definition 5.10. Let C be a class of Kripke frames. Then, we write:
(1) CKMJ for the class of all intuitionistic Mkrtychev models over frames from C;
(2) CKMJT for the class of all factive intuitionistic Mkrtychev models over frames from C;
(3) CKMJ4 for the class of all introspective intuitionistic Mkrtychev models over frames from C;
(4) CKMJT4 for the class of all factive and introspective intuitionistic Mkrtychev models over C.
Definition 5.11. Let M = 〈F, E ,〉 be a intuitionistic Mkrtychev model and let CS be a constant specification
(for some proof calculus). We say that M respects CS if for all x ∈ F and all c : φ ∈ CS: φ ∈ Ec(x).
Given a class C of intuitionistic Mkrtychev models, we denote the class of all intuitionistic Mkrtychev models
respecting a constant specification CS by CCS .
Definition 5.12. Let C be a class of intuitionistic Mkrtychev models. We write Γ |=C φ if for all M ∈ C and
all x ∈ D(M): (M, x) |= Γ implies (M, x) |= φ.
Lemma 5.13. Let I be an intermediate logic and IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40}. Let CS be a constant
specification for IJL0 and let C ∈ KFr(I). For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ :
Γ ⊢IJLCS φ implies Γ |=CKMJLCS φ.
Proof. By an argument similar to the one of Lemma 3.13, we may reduce strong to weak soundness:
Γ ⊢IJLCS φ impl. ∃Γ0 ⊆ Γ ∪ CS finite
(
⊢IJL0
∧
Γ0 → φ
)
impl. ∃Γ0 ⊆ Γ ∪ CS finite
(
|=CKMJL
∧
Γ0 → φ
)
impl. ∃Γ0 ⊆ Γ ∪ CS finite ∀M ∈ CKMJL∀x ∈ D(M)∀y ≥ x ((M, y) |= Γ0 ⇒ (M, y) |= φ)
impl. ∃Γ0 ⊆ Γ ∪ CS finite ∀M ∈ CKMJL∀x ∈ D(M) ((M, x) |= Γ0 ⇒ (M, x) |= φ)
impl. ∀M ∈ CKMJL∀x ∈ D(M) ((M, x) |= Γ ∪ CS ⇒ (M, x) |= φ)
impl. ∀M ∈ CKMJLCS∀x ∈ D(M) ((M, x) |= Γ⇒ (M, x) |= φ) .
Thus, we only show that ⊢IJL0 φ implies |=CKMJL φ. As before, by definition of IJL0, it suffices to show
|=CKMJL φ for φ ∈ I or φ being an instance of the justification axioms (depending on IJL0). For both, let
M = 〈F, E ,〉 ∈ CKMJL as well as x ∈ D(M).
If φ ∈ I, then there is a substitution σ : V ar → LJ such that φ = σ(ψ) for some ψ ∈ I. By the choice of C,
we have that (N, y) |= ψ for any N = 〈F,′〉 and any y ∈ D(F). Define a particular ′ by
y ′ p iff (M, y) |= σ(p)
for any p ∈ V ar and any y ∈ F and define N := 〈F,′〉. Then, it is straightforward to see that (M, y) |= σ(χ)
iff (N, y) |= χ for any χ ∈ L0 and thus especially, we have (M, x) |= φ. This gives |=CKMJL φ.
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If φ is an instance of (J) or (+), then the conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 5.7, respectively, give the
validity of φ immediately.
Similarly if φ is an instance of (F ) and M is factive or φ is an instance of (I) and M is introspective, the
respective validity of φ follows immediately by the definition of factive or introspective intuitionistic Mkrtychev
models, that is (1) or (2) of Definition 5.9 
5.3. Intuitionistic Fitting models. We continue with intuitionistic Fitting models, combining various streams
of semantics in non-classical modal logics by extending the approach using intuitionistic modal Kripke models
of [32] for intuitionistic modal logics by the machinery of evidence functions for explicit modalities in the sense
of Fitting (or conversely extending Fittings models with the machinery of intuitionistic Kripke frames). In
any way, the models which we introduce are akin to a model class from [27] for IPCJ T 4 (which are called
intuitionistic modular models there).
Definition 5.14. Let F = 〈F,≤〉 be a Kripke frame. An intuitionistic Fitting model based on F is a structure
M = 〈F,R, E ,〉 such that ⊆ F × V ar, R ⊆ F × F and E : Jt× F → 2LJ satisfy
(1) x ≤ y and x  p imply y  p for all p ∈ V ar,
(2) x ≤ y and φ ∈ Et(x) imply φ ∈ Et(y) for all φ ∈ LJ and all t ∈ Jt,
(3) x ≤ y implies R[y] ⊆ R[x].
for all x, y ∈ F as well as
(i) Et(x) ⊐ Es(x) ⊆ E[t·s](x) for all x ∈ F and all t, s ∈ Jt,
(ii) Et(x) ∪ Es(x) ⊆ E[t+s](x) for all x ∈ F and all t, s ∈ Jt.
Over an intuitionistic Fitting model M = 〈F,R, E ,〉, we introduce the following local satisfaction relation
by recursion:
• (M, x) 6|= ⊥;
• (M, x) |= p if x  p;
• (M, x) |= φ ∧ ψ if (M, x) |= φ and (M, x) |= ψ;
• (M, x) |= φ ∨ ψ if (M, x) |= φ or (M, x) |= ψ;
• (M, x) |= φ→ ψ if ∀y ∈ F (x ≤ y ⇒ (M, x) 6|= φ or (M, x) |= ψ);
• (M, x) |= t : φ if φ ∈ Et(x) and ∀y ∈ R[x] (M, y) |= φ.
We write (M, x) |= Γ if (M, x) |= γ for all γ ∈ Γ. Also, given an intuitionistic Fitting model M over a Kripke
frame F = 〈F,≤, V 〉, we write again D(M) = F .
Lemma 5.15. Let M be an intuitionistic Fitting model over a Kripke frame F = 〈F,≤〉. For any φ ∈ LJ and
all x, y ∈ F :
x ≤ y and (M, x) |= φ imply (M, y) |= φ.
Definition 5.16. Let F = 〈F,≤〉 be a Kripke frame and M = 〈F,R, E ,〉 be an intuitionistic Fitting model.
We call M
(1) reflexive if R is reflexive,
(2) transitive if R is transitive,
(3) monotone if Et(x) ⊆ Et(y) for y ∈ R[x],
(4) introspective if it is transitive, monotone and t : Et(x) ⊆ E!t(x) for all t ∈ Jt and x ∈ F .
Definition 5.17. Let C be a class of intuitionistic Fitting models. We write Γ |=C φ if for all M ∈ C and all
x ∈ D(M): (M, x) |= Γ implies (M, x) |= φ.
Definition 5.18. Let C be a class of Kripke frames. Then, we write:
(1) CKFJ for the class of all intuitionistic Fitting models over frames from C;
(2) CKFJT for the class of all reflexive intuitionistic Fitting models over frames from C;
(3) CKFJ4 for the class of all introspective intuitionistic Fitting models over frames from C;
(4) CKFJT4 for the class of all reflexive and introspective intuitionistic Fitting models over frames from C.
Lemma 5.19. Let I be an intermediate logic and IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40}. Let CS be a constant
specification for IJL0 and let C ∈ KFr(I). Then, for any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ :
Γ ⊢IJLCS φ implies Γ |=CKFJLCS φ.
Proof. As in Lemma 5.13, we may restrict ourselves to weak soundness only. Here, it again suffices to only
verify (M, x) |= φ for any φ ∈ I or φ being a instance of a justification axiom (depending on IJL0) as well as
any M ∈ CKFJL and any x ∈ D(M).
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The case for φ ∈ I can be handled similarly as in Lemma 5.13. We thus only show the validity of (1) (J),
(2) (+) as well as (3) (F ) and (4) (I) in their respective model classes. For this, let M = 〈F,R, E ,〉 be an
intuitionistic Fitting model with F ∈ C.
(1) We show
(M, x) |= t : (φ→ ψ) impl. (M, x) |= (s : φ→ [t · s] : ψ)
for any φ, ψ ∈ LJ , any t, s ∈ Jt and any x ∈ F . For this, suppose (M, x) |= t : (φ → ψ), that is by
definition φ→ ψ ∈ Et(x) as well as
∀y ∈ R[x] (M, y) |= φ→ ψ.
Let y ≥ x and suppose (M, y) |= s : φ, that is φ ∈ Es(y) and
∀z ∈ R[y] (M, z) |= φ.
By condition (2) of Definition 5.14, we have that φ → ψ ∈ Et(y). By condition (i), we have thus that
ψ ∈ E[t·s](y). Now, let z ∈ R[y]. As above, we have (M, z) |= φ and by condition (3) of Definition 5.14,
we have that z ∈ R[x] and thus (M, z) |= φ→ ψ. Thus, we have especially (M, z) |= ψ.
Therefore, we have ∀z ∈ R[y] (M, z) |= ψ and in combination with ψ ∈ E[t·s](y), we have (M, y) |=
[t · s] : ψ. As y was arbitrary, we have (M, x) |= s : φ→ [t · s] : ψ.
As x ∈ F was arbitrary, we have (M, x) |= t : (φ→ ψ)→ (s : φ→ [t · s] : ψ).
(2) Let x ∈ F be arbitrary. Suppose (M, x) |= t : φ, that is
φ ∈ Et(x) and ∀y ∈ R[x] (M, x) |= φ.
The former gives φ ∈ E[t+s](x) by condition (ii) of Definition 5.14 and this combined with the latter
gives
(M, x) |= [t+ s] : φ.
As x ∈ F war arbitrary, we have (M, x) |= t : φ→ [t+ s] : φ. One shows (M, x) |= s : φ→ [t+ s] : φ in
a similar way.
(3) Suppose M is reflexive and let x ∈ F . Suppose
(M, x) |= t : φ
that is especially we have ∀y ∈ R[x] (M, y) |= φ. As R is reflexive, we have x ∈ R[x] and thus
(M, x) |= φ. As x was arbitrary, we have
(M, x) |= t : φ→ φ.
(4) Let M be introspective and let x ∈ F . Suppose that (M, x) |= t : φ, that is
φ ∈ Et(x) and ∀y ∈ R[x] (M, x) |= φ.
The former gives at first t : φ ∈ E!t(x) by introspectivity. Now, let y ∈ R[x] be arbitrary. By the
monotonicity aspect of introspectivity, we have φ ∈ Et(y) as φ ∈ Et(x). Now, let z ∈ R[y]. By
transitivity of R, we have z ∈ R[x] and thus (M, z) |= φ by assumption. Summarized, we have
φ ∈ Et(y) and ∀z ∈ R[y] (M, z) |= φ,
that is (M, y) |= t : φ for all y ∈ R[x] and this combined with t : φ ∈ E!t(x) gives (M, x) |=!t : t : φ. As
x was arbitrary, we have (M, x) |= t : φ→!t : t : φ.

5.4. Intuitionistic subset models. The last semantics which we introduce, based on intuitionistic Kripke
frames, extends the considerations of Lehmann and Studer from [26] about their subset models to these inter-
mediate cases. This semantics seems to have not appeared in the literature before.
Definition 5.20. Let F = 〈F0,≤〉 be a Kripke frame. An intuitionistic subset model over F is a structure
M = 〈F, F, E ,〉 with F ⊇ F0 E : Jt→ 2F×F and ⊆ F × LJ and which satisfies
(1) x ≤ y and x  p imply y  p for all p ∈ V ar,
(2) x ≤ y implies Et[y] ⊆ Et[x] for all t ∈ Jt,
for all x, y ∈ F0 as well as
(i) x 6 ⊥,
(ii) x  φ ∧ ψ iff x  φ and x  ψ,
(iii) x  φ ∨ ψ iff x  φ or x  ψ,
(iv) x  φ→ ψ iff ∀y ≥ x : y 6 φ or y  ψ,
(v) x  t : φ iff ∀y ∈ Et[x] : y  φ,
for any x ∈ F0 and such that it satisfies:
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(a) E[t+s][x] ⊆ Et[x] ∩ Es[x];
(b) E[t·s][x] ⊆ {y ∈ F | ∀φ ∈ (M)
x
t,s(y  φ)} where we define
(M)vt,s := {φ ∈ LJ | ∃ψ ∈ LJ∀y ∈ F (y ∈ Et[x]⇒ y  ψ → φ and y ∈ Es[x]⇒ y  ψ)}.
We write D0(M) for F0 and D(M) for F . Also, given x ∈ D(M), we write (M, x) |= φ if x  φ and (M, x) |= Γ
if (M, x) |= γ for all γ ∈ Γ, given Γ∪{φ} ⊆ LJ . We write M |= φ if for all x ∈ D0(M): (M, x) |= φ and similarly
for sets Γ. Note the emphasis on D0(M), not D(M).
Lemma 5.21. Let F = 〈F0,≤〉 be a Kripke frame and M = 〈F, F, E ,〉 be an intuitionistic subset model over
F. Then, for all φ ∈ LJ and all x, y ∈ F0:
x ≤ y and x  φ imply y  φ.
Definition 5.22. Let F = 〈F0,≤〉 be a Kripke frame and M = 〈F, F, E ,〉 be an intuitionistic subset model.
We call M
(1) reflexive if x ∈ Et[x] for all x ∈ F0 and all t ∈ Jt,
(2) introspective if E!t[x] ⊆ {y ∈ F | ∀φ ∈ LJ(x  t : φ⇒ y  t : φ)}.
Definition 5.23. Let C be a class of intuitionistic subset models. We write Γ |=C φ if for all M ∈ C and all
x ∈ D0(M): (M, x) |= Γ implies (M, x) |= φ.
Definition 5.24. Let C be a class of Kripke frames. Then, we write:
(1) CKSJ for the class of all intuitionistic subset models over frames from C;
(2) CKSJT for the class of all reflexive intuitionistic subset models over frames from C;
(3) CKSJ4 for the class of all introspective intuitionistic subset models over frames from C;
(4) CKSJT4 for the class of all reflexive and introspective intuitionistic subset models over frames from C.
Definition 5.25. Let F = 〈F0,≤〉 be a Kripke frame and M = 〈F, F, E ,〉 be an intuitionistic subset model
over F. Let CS be a constant specification (for some proof system). We say that M respects CS if
x  c : φ
for all c : φ ∈ CS and all x ∈ F0.
Given a class C of intuitionistic subset models, we write CCS for the subclass of all models respecting a
constant specification CS.
Lemma 5.26. Let I be an intermediate logic and IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40}. Let CS be a constant
specification for IJL0. Let C ∈ KFr(I). For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ :
Γ ⊢IJLCS φ implies Γ |=CkSJLCS φ.
Proof. Reasoning as in Lemmas 5.13 and 5.19, we restrict the argument and only show the validity of (J), (+), (F )
and (I) in their respective model classes. For this, let M = 〈F, F, E ,〉 be a intuitionistic subset model over a
Kripke frame F and let x ∈ F0.
(1) For (J), suppose x  t : (φ → ψ). Now, we want to show x  s : φ → [t · s] : ψ. For this, let y ≥ x.
Note that then y ∈ F0 as ≤ is only a relation on F0. Suppose y  s : φ, that is
(†) ∀z ∈ Es[y] z  φ.
Further, x  t : (φ→ ψ) implies y  t : (φ→ ψ) by Lemma 5.21, that is
(‡) ∀z ∈ Et[y] z  φ→ ψ.
Let z ∈ E[t·s][y]. Then, by property (b) of Definition 5.20, we have
z ∈ {w ∈ F | ∀χ ∈ (M)yt,s w  χ}
and thus it suffices to show ψ ∈ (M)yt,s. But this is immediate by (†) and (‡). Thus
∀z ∈ E[t·s][y] z  ψ
which is y  [t · s] : ψ and thus x  s : φ → [t · s] : ψ. As x was arbitrary, we have x  t : (φ → ψ) →
(s : φ→ [t · s] : ψ) for all x ∈ F0.
(2) Suppose x  t : φ. That is, we have
∀y ∈ Et[x] y  φ.
Then, by condition (a) of Definition 5.20, we have
∀y ∈ E[t+s][x] ⊆ Et[x] y  φ
which is x  [t + s] : φ. As x was arbitrary, we have x  t : φ → [t + s] : φ for any x ∈ F0. Similarly,
one shows x  s : φ→ [t+ s] : φ for any x ∈ F0.
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(3) Let M be reflexive with x  t : φ. Then, we have
∀y ∈ Et[x] y  φ,
that is as M is reflexive x ∈ Et[x] and thus x  φ. As x was arbitrary, we have x  t : φ → φ for any
x ∈ F0.
(4) Let M be introspective x  t : φ. Then, we have
∀y ∈ E!t[x] y  t : φ
by definition of introspectivity but this is exactly x !t : t : φ. Again we have x  t : φ →!t : t : φ for
any x ∈ F0 as x was arbitrary.

6. Completeness for frame semantics
In this section, we prove the corresponding completeness theorems for the intermediate justification logics
together with their previously introduced semantics based on Mkrtychev, Fitting or subset models over intu-
itionistic Kripke frames. The permissible classes of frames for the completeness theorems derive, similarly as
the permissible classes of Heyting algebras from the completeness theorems for the algebraic models, from the
underlying intermediate logic where we especially rely on the global completeness statement introduced earlier.
6.1. Completeness w.r.t. intuitionistic Mkrtychev models.
Definition 6.1. Let F = 〈F,≤〉 be a Kripke frame and letN ∈M0(F;L⋆0). We define the canonical intuitionistic
Mkrtychev model over N as the structure Mc,M
N
= 〈F, Ec,c〉 by setting:
(1) x c p iff x ∗ p;
(2) Ect (x) := {φ ∈ LJ | x 
∗ φt}.
Lemma 6.2. Let F = 〈F,≤〉 be a Kripke frame, let N ∈M0(F;L⋆0) and let M
c,M
N
= 〈F, Ec,c〉 as above. Then
for all φ ∈ LJ and all x ∈ F :
(Mc,M
N
, x) |= φ iff (N, x) |= φ⋆.
Proof. We prove it by induction on φ. The claim is immediate for p ∈ V ar by definition. Suppose the claim is
true for φ, ψ. Then, we have at first
(Mc,M
N
, x) |= φ ∧ ψ iff (Mc,M
N
, x) |= φ and (Mc,M
N
, x) |= ψ
iff (N, x) |= φ⋆ and (N, x) |= ψ⋆
iff (N, x) |= (φ ∧ ψ)⋆
and similarly for ∨. For →, we have
(Mc,M
N
, x) |= φ→ ψ iff ∀y ≥ x : (Mc,M
N
, y) |= φ implies (Mc,M
N
, y) |= ψ
iff ∀y ≥ x : (N, y) |= φ⋆ implies (N, y) |= ψ⋆
iff (N, x) |= φ⋆ → ψ⋆.
Lastly, we have
(Mc,M
N
, x) |= t : φ iff φ ∈ Ect (x)
iff x ∗ φt
iff (N, x) |= φt.

Lemma 6.3. Let F = 〈F,≤〉 be a Kripke frame and let N ∈M0(F;L⋆0) such that additionally N |= (ThIJLCS )
⋆.
Then Mc,M
N
is a well-defined intuitionistic Mkrtychev model. Further:
(a) if (F ) is an axiom scheme of IJL0, then M
c,M
N
is factive;
(b) if (I) is an axiom scheme of IJL0, then M
c,M
N
is introspective.
Proof. We first show properties (1) and (2) of Definition 5.7. For this, let x, y ∈ F with x ≤ y. For (1), we have
x c p⇒ x ∗ p⇒ y ∗ p⇒ y c p
and for (2), we have
φ ∈ Et(x)⇒ x 
∗ φt ⇒ y 
∗ φt ⇒ φ ∈ Et(y).
Both follow from Lemma 5.3 applied to N.
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For properties (i) and (ii), let x ∈ F and t, s ∈ Jt. Then, at first for (i), let φ ∈ Ect (x) ⊐ E
c
s (x), that is by
definition ∃ψ ∈ LJ :
ψ → φ ∈ Ect (x) and ψ ∈ E
c
s (x).
Untangling the definition of Ec, we have
x ∗ (ψ → φ)t and x 
∗ ψs.
As we have N |= (ThIJLCS )
⋆, we have by the ⋆-translation of the axiom scheme (J) that ∀y ≥ x:
y ∗ (ψ → φ)t and y 
∗ ψs implies y 
∗ φ[t·s]
and thus especially, as x ≥ x, we have x ∗ φ[t·s] and thus φ ∈ E
c
[t·s](x).
For (ii), let φ ∈ Ect (x) ∪ E
c
s (x). Then, we have x 
∗ φt or x 
∗ φs. By the ⋆-translation of the axiom scheme
(+) and N |= (ThIJLCS )
⋆, we have in either case as before x ∗ φ[t+s].
Now, for (a), if (F ) is an axiom scheme of IJL0, then we have by N |= (ThIJLCS )
⋆ again, that
x ∗ φt implies (N, x) |= φ
⋆.
By the definition of Ec and Lemma 6.2, we have thus
φ ∈ Ect (x) implies (M
c,M
N
, x) |= φ
and thus Mc,M
N
is factive.
For (b), if (I) is an axiom scheme of IJL0, then we have
x ∗ φt implies x 
∗ (t : φ)!t
and by definition that is
φ ∈ Ect (x) implies t : φ ∈ E
c
!t(x)
which is t : Ect (x) ⊆ E
c
!t(x) and thus M
c,M
N
is introspective. 
Theorem 6.4. Let I be an intermediate logic, IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40} and let CS be a constant
specification for IJL0. Let C ∈ KFr(I) ∩ KFr
g(I). For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , we have:
Γ ⊢IJLCS φ iff Γ |=CKMJLCS φ.
Proof. The direction from left to right follows from Lemma 5.13. For the converse, suppose Γ 6⊢IJLCS φ. By
Lemma 4.1, we have
Γ⋆ ∪ (ThIJLCS )
⋆ 6⊢I⋆ φ
⋆
and by assumption on the global strong completeness of I w.r.t. C, there is a N = 〈F,∗〉 ∈ M0(C;L⋆0) such
that
N |= Γ⋆ ∪ (ThIJLCS )
⋆ but N 6|= φ⋆.
By Lemma 6.3, we have Mc,M
N
∈ CKMJL for the corresponding canonical intuitionistic Mkrtychev model. By
Lemma 6.2, we have
M
c,M
N
|= CS
and thus Mc,M
N
∈ CKMJLCS as well as
M
c,M
N
|= Γ but Mc,M
N
6|= φ.
Thus, we have Γ 6|=CKMJLCS φ. 
6.2. Completeness w.r.t. intuitionistic Fitting models.
Definition 6.5. Let F = 〈F,≤〉 be a Kripke frame and letN ∈M0(F;L⋆0). We define the canonical intuitionistic
Fitting model over N as the structure Mc,F
N
= 〈F,Rc, Ec,c〉 by setting:
(1) x c p iff x ∗ p;
(2) Ect (x) := {φ ∈ LJ | x 
∗ φt};
(3) (x, y) ∈ Rc iff ∀t ∈ Jt∀φ ∈ LJ (x ∗ φt ⇒ (N, y) |= φ⋆).
Lemma 6.6. Let F = 〈F,≤〉 be a Kripke frame, let N ∈ M0(F;L⋆0) and define M
c,F
N
as above. For any φ ∈ LJ
and all x ∈ F :
(Mc,F
N
, x) |= φ iff (N, x) |= φ⋆.
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Proof. The claim is again proved by induction on the structure of the formula. We only consider the modal
case. Suppose the claim holds for all x ∈ F and some φ ∈ LJ .
At first, suppose (N, x) |= φt, i.e. x ∗ φt. Then, naturally φ ∈ Ect (x) by definition. Let further y ∈ R
c[x].
Then, as x ∗ φt, we have (N, y) |= φ⋆ by definition and thus (M
c,F
N
, x) |= φ by induction hypothesis. Thus, we
have
φ ∈ Ect (x) and ∀y ∈ R
c[x] (Mc,F
N
, x) |= φ
and thus (Mc,F
N
, x) |= t : φ.
Conversely, suppose (N, x) 6|= φt, that is x 6∗ φt. Thus, by definition φ 6∈ Ect (x) and thus
(Mc,F
N
, x) 6|= t : φ
immediately by definition. 
Lemma 6.7. Let F = 〈F,≤〉 be a Kripke frame and let N ∈M0(F;L⋆0) such that additionally N |= (ThIJLCS )
⋆.
Then Mc,F
N
is a well-defined intuitionistic Fitting model. Further:
(a) if (F ) is an axiom scheme of IJL0, then M
c,F
N
is reflexive;
(b) if (I) is an axiom scheme of IJL0, then M
c,F
N
is introspective.
Proof. For properties (1) - (3) of Definition 5.14, let x, y ∈ F with x ≤ y. For (1) and (2), we have as before
x c p⇒ x ∗ p⇒ y ∗ p⇒ y c p
and
φ ∈ Et(x)⇒ x 
∗ φt ⇒ y 
∗ φt ⇒ φ ∈ Et(y)
by Lemma 5.3 for N. For (3), let z ∈ R[y], that is we have
∀t ∈ Jt∀φ ∈ LJ (y 
∗ φt ⇒ (N, z) |= φ
⋆).
Then, for any t ∈ Jt and any φ ∈ LJ we have, if x ∗ φt that y ∗ φt by Lemma 5.3 and thus by the above
(N, z) |= φ⋆. Thus z ∈ R[x] and thus R[y] ⊆ R[x].
We have properties (1) and (2) of Definition 5.14 in the same way as in the proof of Lemma 6.3. For (3), let
z ∈ Rc[y] for x ≤ y, that is
∀t ∈ Jt∀φ ∈ LJ (y 
∗ φt ⇒ (N, z) |= φ
⋆).
If x ∗ φt, then y 
∗ φt by Lemma 5.3 and thus by the above (N, z) |= φ⋆. Thus z ∈ Rc[y].
For property (i), let φ ∈ Ect (x) ⊐ E
c
s (x), i.e.
∃ψ ∈ LJ (ψ → φ ∈ E
c
t (x) and ψ ∈ E
c
s (x)) .
Thus, by definition, we have
x ∗ (ψ → φ)t and x 
∗ ψs
and thus, as N |= (ThIJLCS )
⋆, we have
x ∗ φ[t·s],
that is φ ∈ Ect·s(x).
For property (ii), note that x ∗ φt implies x 
∗ φ[t+s] again by N |= (ThIJLCS )
⋆ and thus φ ∈ Ect (x) implies
φEct+s(x) and similarly for φ ∈ E
c
s (x).
Suppose that (F ) is an axiom scheme of IJL0. Then, we have
∀t ∈ Jt∀φ ∈ LJ (x 
∗ φt ⇒ (N, x) |= φ
⋆)
as N |= (ThIJLCS )
⋆ and this is exactly (x, x) ∈ Rc.
Suppose that (I) is an axiom scheme of IJL0. As in the case of intuitionistic Mkrtychev models, one shows
t : Ect (x) ⊆ E
c
!t(x).
For the transitivity of Rc, let (x, y), (y, z) ∈ Rc. that is, we have
∀t ∈ Jt∀φ ∈ LJ (x 
∗ φt ⇒ (N, y) |= φ
⋆)
as well as
∀t ∈ Jt∀φ ∈ LJ (y 
∗ φt ⇒ (N, z) |= φ
⋆) .
As (I) is an axiom scheme and N |= (ThIJLCS )
⋆, we have
w ∗ φt ⇒ w 
∗ (t : φ)!t
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for any w ∈ F . Thus, especially we have
x ∗ φt ⇒ x 
∗ (t : φ)!t ⇒ y 
∗ φt ⇒ (N, z) |= φ
⋆
using Lemma 6.6. Thus, by definition we have (x, z) ∈ Rc.
For the monotonicity, let y ∈ Rc[x] and let φ ∈ Et(x). The former gives
∀t ∈ Jt∀φ ∈ LJ (x 
∗ φt ⇒ (N, y) |= φ
⋆)
and the latter gives x ∗ φt. As N |= (ThIJLCS )
⋆, we have especially x ∗ (t : φ!t). By the above, we have
(N, y) |= φt, that is y ∗ φt and thus φ ∈ Ect (y). Thus, M
c,F
N
is monotone and thus Mc,F
N
is introspective. 
Theorem 6.8. Let I be an intermediate logic, IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40} and let CS be a constant
specification for IJL0. Let C ∈ KFr(I) ∩ KFr
g(I). For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , we have:
Γ ⊢IJLCS φ iff Γ |=CKFJLCS φ.
Proof. The direction from left to right now comes from Lemma 5.19. For the converse, we again use Lemma
4.1 and the assumptions on C to obtain a N = 〈F,∗〉 ∈ M0(C;L
⋆
0) with
N |= Γ⋆ ∪ (ThIJLCS )
⋆ but N 6|= φ⋆.
Using Lemmas 6.7 and 6.6, we obtain as before that Mc,F
N
∈ CKFJLCS as well as
M
c,F
N
|= Γ but Mc,F
N
6|= φ,
that is Γ 6|=CKFJLCS φ. 
6.3. Completeness w.r.t. intuitionistic subset models.
Definition 6.9. Let F = 〈F0,≤〉 be a Kripke frame and let N ∈ M0(F;L
⋆
0). We define the canonical intuition-
istic subset model over N as the structure Mc,S
N
= 〈F, F c, Ec,c〉 by setting:
(1) F c = F0 ∪
⋃
x∈F0
{xt | t ∈ Jt};
(2) (x, y) ∈ Ect iff ∀φ ∈ LJ (x 
∗ φt ⇒ y c φ) for all x, y ∈ F c;
(3) for x ∈ F0 and t ∈ Jt:
(a) x c φ iff (N, x) |= φ⋆;
(b) xt 
c φ iff (N, x) |= φt.
Lemma 6.10. Let F = 〈F0,≤〉 be a Kripke frame, let N ∈ M0(F;L⋆0) and define M
c,S
N
as above. For any
φ ∈ LJ and any x ∈ F0:
(Mc,S
N
, x) |= φ iff (N, x) |= φ⋆.
Proof. This is immediate by definition as we have (Mc,S
N
, x) |= φ iff x c φ iff (N, x) |= φ⋆, given a x ∈ F0. 
The simplicity of the above lemma is in contrast to the truth lemmas for the previous canonical models
over Kripke frames. In the context of intuitionistic subset models, the relation  completely encodes the truth
values of formulae to be able to cope with ”irregular” worlds. This comes with the expense of conditions of
well-definedness for  and thus, the previous complexity of showing an equivalence like the one of the above
lemma is shifted into the following result.
Lemma 6.11. Let F = 〈F0,≤〉 be a Kripke frame and let N ∈ M0(F;L⋆0) such that additionally N |=
(ThIJLCS )
⋆. Then Mc,S
N
is a well-defined intuitionistic subset model. Further:
(I) if (F ) is an axiom scheme of IJL0, then M
c,S
N
is reflexive;
(II) if (I) is an axiom scheme of IJL0, then M
c,S
N
is introspective.
Proof. We begin with properties (i) - (v) from Definition 5.20. For this, let x ∈ F0. The properties (i) - (iii) are
immediate by using the respective properties of ∗ and the fact that ⋆ commutes with ⊥,∧,∨.
For (iv), note that we have
x c φ→ ψ iff (N, x) |= φ⋆ → ψ⋆
iff ∀y ≥ x ((N, y) 6|= φ⋆ or (N, y) |= ψ⋆)
iff ∀y ≥ x (y 6c φ or y c ψ)
where it is instrumental that ≤ is a relation on F0 only.
For (v), we have for one by definition that
∀y ∈ Ect [x]∀φ ∈ LJ ((N, x) |= φt ⇒ (N, y) |= φ
⋆) ,
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that is we have
x c t : φ⇒ x ∗ φt
⇒ ∀y ∈ Ect [x] ((N, y) |= φ
⋆)
⇔ ∀y ∈ Ect [x] (y 
c φ) .
For another, we have xt ∈ Et[x] as we have xt c φ iff x ∗ φt by definition. Thus, if x 6c t : φ, then x 6∗ φt
and thus xt 6c φ. Therefore
x 6c t : φ⇒ ∃y ∈ Et[x] (y 6
c φ) .
Concluding, we have x c t : φ iff ∀y ∈ Ect [x] (y 
c φ).
Regarding properties (1) and (2) of Definition 5.20, let x ≤ y for x, y ∈ F0. Property (1) follows as in the
proof of Lemma 6.7 by (3).(a) of Definition 6.9. For property (2), let z ∈ Ect [y]. Thus, we have
∀φ ∈ LJ (y 
c t : φ⇒ z c φ)
and if x c t : φ, then as x, y ∈ F0, we have x ∗ φt and thus y ∗ φt which is y c t : φ. By the above, we
have z c φ and thus z ∈ Ect [x].
Now, on to properties (a), (b) of Definition 5.20. For (a), let y ∈ Ec[t+s][x], that is we have
∀φ ∈ LJ (x 
∗ φ[t+s] ⇒ (N, y) |= φ
⋆)
by definition. Now, by assumption as N |= (ThIJLCS )
⋆ we have x ∗ φt implies x 
∗ φ[t+s] and x 
∗ φs implies
x ∗ φ[t+s]. Therefore, we have
∀φ ∈ LJ (x 
∗ φt ⇒ x 
∗ φ[t+s] ⇒ (N, y) |= φ
⋆)
and
∀φ ∈ LJ (x 
∗ φs ⇒ x 
∗ φ[t+s] ⇒ (N, y) |= φ
⋆)
which is y ∈ Ect [x] ∩ E
c
s [x].
For (b), let y ∈ Ec[t·s][x], that is
(†) ∀φ ∈ LJ (x 
∗ φ[t·s] ⇒ (N, y) |= φ
⋆).
Let φ ∈ (Mc,S
N
)xt,s, that is there is a ψ ∈ LJ such that
∀z ∈ F c(z ∈ Ect [x]⇒ z 
c ψ → φ and z ∈ Ecs [x]⇒ z 
c ψ).
By property (v), we have that x c t : (ψ → φ) and x c s : ψ, i.e. by definition as x ∈ F0:
(N, x) |= (ψ → φ)t and (N, x) |= ψs
and by N |= (ThIJLCS )
⋆ and axiom (J), we have
(N, x) |= φ[t·s].
Thus, by (†), we have (N, y) |= φ⋆ and thus by definition y c φ.
Assume second to last that (F ) is an axiom scheme of IJL0. Then, we have
x ∗ φt ⇒ (N, x) |= φ
⋆
for all x ∈ F0 and all φ ∈ LJ , t ∈ Jt as N |= (ThIJLCS )
⋆ and thus, by definition we have x ∈ Ect [x] for all t ∈ Jt.
Assume last that (I) is an axiom scheme of IJL0. Let y ∈ E!t[x], that is
(‡) ∀φ ∈ LJ (x 
∗ φ!t ⇒ (N, y) |= φ
⋆).
Let φ ∈ LJ and assume x c t : φ, that is x ∗ φt. Then, as N |= (ThIJLCS )
⋆, we have x ∗ (t : φ)!t. By (‡)
we have (N, y) |= (t : φ)⋆, that is (N, y) |= φt and thus by definition y c t : φ. 
Theorem 6.12. Let I be an intermediate logic, IJL0 ∈ {IJ 0, IJ T 0, IJ 40, IJ T 40} and let CS be a constant
specification for IJL0. Let C ∈ KFr(I) ∩ KFr
g(I). Then, for any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , we have:
Γ ⊢IJLCS φ iff Γ |=CKSJLCS φ.
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Proof. Lemma 5.26 gives the direction from left to right. As before, Lemma 4.1 as well as the assumptions on
C give a L⋆0-model N = 〈F,
∗〉 ∈ M0(C;L⋆0) with
N |= (ThIJLCS )
⋆,N |= Γ⋆ but N 6|= φ⋆.
The first part give that Mc,S
N
is a well-defined CKSJL-model by Lemma 6.11 and Lemma 6.10 gives
M
c,S
N
|= Γ but Mc,S
N
6|= φ.
as well as Mc,S
N
|= CS, i.e. Mc,S
N
∈ CKSJLCS . Therefore, by definition Γ 6|=CKSJLCS φ. 
7. Conclusion
The completeness theorems proved in this paper show that behind any previous completeness result in the
literature stands a unified completeness theorem lifting classes of algebras or classes of Kripke frames complete
for some intermediate logic to a complete model class for the corresponding justification logic. Key to this is of
course the strong completeness assumption of the underlying propositional logic and it remains open whether
there are similar liftings of weak propositional completeness to weak completeness on the justification side.
We want to acknowledge that the algebraic results can be generalized in an immediate way. E.g. with an
algebraic Fitting model M = 〈A,W ,R, E ,V〉 over a complete Heyting algebra A, A can be generalized to not
be complete but only card(W)+-complete, similarly as in the case of the Kripke-models taking values in Heyting
algebras for intuitionistic modal logics from Ono [32]. This of course also applies to the algebraic subset models.
This study of the general class of intermediate justification logics was initiated, originally, to study exten-
sions of the Go¨del-McKinsey-Tarski translation and modal companions (see e.g. [19, 29] and also [7, 11]) to
the language of justification logics and to relate the intermediate justification logics with hybrid justification
logics (in the sense of [5, 13]). A relationship between hybrid justification logics and intermediate justification
logics could prove to be a similarly fruitful connection as between intermediate logics and modal logics over S4,
interlinking the classical hybrid justification logics with intermediate justification logics and vice versa e.g. in
terms of decidability.
Also, the work on structural proof calculi for intermediate logics from e.g. [9] may be used to prove a (not
completely, but extensive) unified realization theorem between modal and justification logics over an (arbitrary)
intermediate logic.
We end this section by a review of some old results reobtained as corollaries of the here proved completeness
theorems and by mentioning some new intermediate justification logics and their corresponding completeness
results obtainable through this paper.
7.1. The special cases of IPC,G and CPC. As special instances of the completeness results, we in particular
have the following algebraic and frame-based completeness theorems for IPC, G and CPC. For this, consider
first the following collection of algebraic completeness results:
We use H to denote the class of all Heyting algebras. An important instance of a linear Heyting algebra is
the standard Go¨del algebra [0,1]G given by
[0,1]G := 〈[0, 1],min,max,⇒, 0, 1〉
where
x⇒ y :=
{
1 if x ≤ y
y otherwise
for x, y ∈ [0, 1]. The natural canonical choice of a Boolean algebra is the algebra
{0,1}B := 〈{0, 1},min,max,⇒, 0, 1〉
with the above function ⇒ restricted to {0, 1}.
Theorem 7.1. We have the following algebraic completeness results:
(1) IPC is strongly complete with respect to Hfin;
(2) G is strongly complete with respect to [0,1]G;
(3) CPC is strongly complete with respect to {0,1}B.
All items are folklore by now. For example, item (2) was proven by Dummett in [10]. Based on Theorems
4.4, 4.7 and 4.10, we obtain the following particular corollaries.
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Corollary 7.2. Let IPCJL0 ∈ {IPCJ 0, IPCJ T 0, IPCJ 40, IPCJ T 40} where CS is a constant specification
for IPCJL0. For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , the following are equivalent:
(1) Γ ⊢IPCJLCS φ;
(2) Γ |=1
HfinAMJLCS
φ;
(3) Γ |=1
HfinAFJL
c
CS
φ;
(4) Γ |=1
HfinASJL
c
CS
φ.
Corollary 7.3. Let GJL0 ∈ {GJ 0,GJ T 0,GJ 40,GJ T 40} where CS is a constant specification for GJL0. For
any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , the following are equivalent:
(1) Γ ⊢GJLCS φ;
(2) Γ |=1[0,1]GAMJLCS φ;
(3) Γ |=1[0,1]GAFJLcCS φ;
(4) Γ |=1[0,1]GASJLcCS φ.
Corollary 7.4. Let CPCJL0 ∈ {CPCJ 0, CPCJ T 0, CPCJ 40, CPCJT 40} where CS is a constant specification
for CPCJL0. For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , the following are equivalent:
(1) Γ ⊢CPCJLCS φ;
(2) Γ |=1{0,1}BAMJLCS φ;
(3) Γ |=1{0,1}BAFJLcCS φ;
(4) Γ |=1{0,1}BASJLcCS φ.
These theorems already contain several well-known results from the literature on semantics for justification
logics. At first, the equivalence between (1) and (5), (6) and (7) in Corollary 7.4 are the known completeness
theorems of Mkrtychev [30], Fitting [12, 14] as well as Lehmann and Studer [26], respectively. Further, the
equivalence between (1) and (5), (6) in Corollary 7.3 are among the completeness results previously obtained
for Go¨del justification logic in [34].
The previous work on semantics of intuitionistic justification logic in the sense of the present paper is mainly
[27], where the authors considered models for IPCJ T 4 based on extending Kripke-frames for intuitionistic
propositional logic by semantic machinery for justification logics from Mkrtychev and Fitting models. The
above corollary 7.2 gives a different semantic approach to IPCJ T 4 and considers various other intuitionistic
justification logics not present in the literature before.
We reobtain these results of [27] through the completeness theorems proved here regarding Mkrtychev,
Fitting and subset models over Kripke frames for intermediate logics. However, considering the wider class of
intermediate logics, we also obtain the following alternative semantic characterizations of IPCJL, GJL and
CPCJL using the semantic characterization of their base logics based on Kripke frames. Let IF be the class of
all intuitionistic Kripke frames and let LIF, SIF be the class of all linear intuitionistic Kripke frames and of all
single-point intuitionistic Kripke frames, respectively. As a well-known result, we have:
Theorem 7.5. For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ :
(1) Γ ⊢IPC φ iff Γ |=IK φ;
(2) Γ ⊢G φ iff Γ |=LIK φ;
(3) Γ ⊢CPC φ iff Γ |=SIK φ.
Item (1) goes back to Kripkes work [21]. Item (2) and (3) are not that easily traceable ((3) is quite immediate),
but for more modern references see e.g. [8]. Combining this with the fact that IF as well as LIF and SIF are
closed under principal subframes, we have by Lemma 5.6:
Corollary 7.6 (of Theorem 7.5). For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ :
(1)’ Γ ⊢IPC φ iff Γ |=
g
IF
φ;
(2)’ Γ ⊢G φ iff Γ |=
g
LIF
φ;
(3)’ Γ ⊢CPC φ iff Γ |=
g
SIF
φ.
Thus, the completeness theorems based on Kripke frames apply and we obtain the following completeness
theorems.
Corollary 7.7. Let IPCJL0 ∈ {IPCJ 0, IPCJ T 0, IPCJ 40, IPCJ T 40} where CS is a constant specification
for IPCJL0. For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , the following are equivalent:
(1) Γ ⊢IPCJLCS φ;
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(2) Γ |=IFKMJLCS φ;
(3) Γ |=IFKFJLCS φ;
(4) Γ |=IFKSJLCS φ.
Corollary 7.8. Let GJL0 ∈ {GJ 0,GJ T 0,GJ 40,GJ T 40} where CS is a constant specification for GJL0. For
any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , the following are equivalent:
(1) Γ ⊢GJLCS φ;
(2) Γ |=LIFKMJLCS φ;
(3) Γ |=LIFKFJLCS φ;
(4) Γ |=LIFKSJLCS φ.
Corollary 7.9. Let CPCJL0 ∈ {CPCJ 0, CPCJ T 0, CPCJ 40, CPCJT 40} where CS is a constant specification
for CPCJL0. For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , the following are equivalent:
(1) Γ ⊢CPCJLCS φ;
(2) Γ |=SIFKMJLCS φ;
(3) Γ |=SIFKFJLCS φ;
(4) Γ |=SIFKSJLCS φ.
In particular, the equivalences between (1), (2) and (3) in Corollary 7.7, for IPC, are the completeness
theorems obtained by Marti and Studer in [27].
7.2. Some less-well-known intermediate justification logics.
7.2.1. Finite-valued Go¨del logics. Prominent strengthenings of the infinite valued Go¨del logic G (or Go¨del-
Dummet logic) are the finite valued Go¨del logics Gn. These actually predate G in the sense that this sequence of
intermediate logics is the one used by Go¨del in [18] for his investigations about intuitionistic logic. G was later
defined by Dummet in [10]. Axiomatically, we can give the following description of Gn. Consider the axiom
scheme
(BC)n:
∨n
i=0
∧
j<i(pj → pi)
for any n ∈ N. Then, we define the n-valued Go¨del logic by
Gn := G ⊕ (BC)n.
The notation for the axiom scheme comes from its use in intermediate logics of bounded cardinality. The usual
semantics for Gn is given by a characteristic matrix through the Heyting algebra
V
(n)
G
:= 〈V (n),min,max,⇒, 0, 1〉
with
V (n) :=
{
1−
1
k
| 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1
}
∪ {1}
and the operation ⇒ as before, restricted to V (n). Indeed, we then have the following completeness theorem.
Theorem 7.10. G is strongly complete with respect to V
(n)
G
.
For the above theorem and more background on the finite valued Go¨del logics, we refer to [8, 36]. Using
Theorems 4.4, 4.7 and 4.10, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 7.11. Let GnJL0 ∈ {GnJ0,GnJT 0,GnJ 40,GnJ T 40} and let CS be a constant specification for
GnJL0. For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , the following are equivalent:
(1) Γ ⊢GnJLCS φ;
(2) Γ |=1
V
(n)
G
AMJLCS
φ;
(3) Γ |=1
V
(n)
G
AFJLcCS
φ;
(4) Γ |=1
V
(n)
G
ASJLcCS
φ.
7.2.2. The logic of the weak law of the excluded middle. Consider the axiom scheme
(WLEM): ¬¬φ ∨ ¬φ
and the corresponding logic of the weak law of the excluded middle, also known as Jankov’s logic (introduced
in [20]), given by
KC := IPC ⊕ (WLEM).
A classical result of Gabbai [15] (see also Smorynski’s [38]) is the completeness result in terms of special Kripke
frames. For this consider the following definition:
30 NICHOLAS PISCHKE
Definition 7.12. A Kripke frame 〈F,≤〉 has topwidth k, if there are k maximal nodes x1, . . . , xk such that for
every y ∈ F , there is a i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that y ≤ xi.
Let TIFk be the class of all intuitionistic Kripke frames with topwidth k. Then, one obtains the following
semantical characterization.
Theorem 7.13 (Gabbai [15]). KC is strongly complete w.r.t. TIF1.
Consindering that the model class in question is closed under principal subframes, we have the following
corollary based on Lemma 5.6.
Corollary 7.14. KC is strongly globally complete w.r.t. TIF1.
This results in the following completeness theorem for justification logics based on Jankov’s logic as a corollary
of Theorems 6.4, 6.8 and 6.12.
Corollary 7.15. Let KCJL0 ∈ {KCJ 0,KCJT 0,KCJ 40,KCJ T 40} where CS is a constant specification for
KCJL0. For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , the following are equivalent:
(1) Γ ⊢KCJLCS φ;
(2) Γ |=TIF1KMJLCS φ;
(3) Γ |=TIF1KFJLCS φ;
(4) Γ |=TIF1KSJLCS φ.
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